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l.

INTRODUCTION

In August 2001, the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association (ABA) voted in favor of a revision to the duty of
confidentiality contained in the ABA' s Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, a set of ethics rules that has been adopted in some form by
over forty states. Specifically, the House voted to broaden the exception
in Model Rule 1.6 that permits a lawyer to reveal confidential
information of the client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary to prevent likely death or substantial bodily harrn. 1 It is
uncertain whether that vote will have any effect on the duty of
confidentiality in California. This is because California, which has not
adopted the Model Rules, has the strictest duty of confidentiality of any
state: it is the duty of every lawyer "[t]o maintain inviolate the
confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve the
secrets, of his or her client."2 Alone among the states, California has no
express exceptions to its duty of confidentiality.3 Accordingly, California
I. At the ABA's annual meeting in Chicago on August 7, 2001, the revisions to
the exception in the Model Rule of Professional Conduct l.6(b)(l) prevailed by a vote of
243 to 184. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (2001); Jonathan D.
Glater, Lawyers May Reveal Secrets of Clients, Bar Group Rules, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 8,
2001, at Al2.
2. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE§ 6068(e) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002).
3. Although California's attorney-client privilege, contained in California
Evidence Code section 954, has exceptions, see CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 956-962 (West
1995), the privilege is not coterminous with the duty of confidentiality. See infra notes
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is also the only state that does not have an express bodily harm
exception to the duty.
What precisely is meant by allowing a lawyer to disclose confidential
information to prevent likely death or serious bodily harm? Consider,
for example, the following hypothetical scenario adapted from the
Restatement (Third) of the La,w Governing Lczwyers:
Client seeks legal advice from Lawyer about client's dismissal from a
maintenance position by Landlord and eviction from his apartment. Client,
visibly angry, reveals that he has set a timed device to bum down the building.
Lawyer knows there are people living in the building. Despite Lawyer's
attempts to persuade him, Client refuses to take any action to prevent the fire or
to warn others. 4

In the foregoing situation, the lawyer has knowledge derived from his
client's confidential communication that death or substantial bodily injury
is likely to result. A person not trained in the law (or at least not an avid
viewer of legal-themed television shows) would probably assume that the
lawyer would disclose the information to prevent the client from causing
the described harm. In fact, the duty of confidentiality in every state but
California has an express exception that would allow such a disclosure.
This Article takes the position that it is finally time for California to
make an unambiguous statement that under appropriate circumstancesa client's criminal actions that will likely result in death or serious bodily
harm-a lawyer may reveal confidential client information to the extent
necessary to prevent that harm. True, the duty of confidentiality is one
of the core duties of the legal profession, fashioned over time to help
ensure the strong attorney-client relationship that is essential to the
effective operation of our legal system. It prohibits lawyers from disclosing
confidential information about their clients, regardless of source.5 Yet,
under the compelling circumstances where the client is engaging in
criminal activity likely to result in death or serious bodily harm, public
policy considerations should outweigh the duty and permit-not
require-the lawyer to disclose confidential information.
Although there are persuasive arguments that certain California
statutes and case law impliedly permit lawyers to reveal confidential
information where life-threatening criminal activity is present,6 the law
regarding confidentiality remains uncertain. The recent approval by the
27-37 and accompanying text (explaining the difference between the duty of
confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege). There is uncertainty whether those
exceptions apply equally to the duty of confidentiality. See infra Part III.
4. REsTATEMENT(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS§ 66 illus. 2 (1998).
5. See infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (explaining the scope of the duty
of confidentiality).
6. See infra Part III.
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ABA' s Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
(Ethics 2000 Commission) of a broader exception than most states
currently have, as well as the recent publication of the Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, places Business and Professions
Code section 6068(e)'s absolute terms in even starker contrast than in
the past. The time has come for either the California Supreme Court, the
California Legislature, or both working in concert to unequivocally
permit lawyers to act in these circumstances.
Part Il of this Article provides background on the duty of confidentiality
and distinguishes it from the attorney-client privilege. It also describes
the duty and its bodily harm exception as it exists in jurisdictions other
than California. It concludes with a discussion of the changes to the
exception proposed by the Ethics 2000 Commission. Part ill then
considers the relationship of the duty of confidentiality to the attorneyclient privilege in California, concluding that a bodily harm exception
cannot be inferred from either the language or statutory scheme of the
privilege, nor can it be inferred from California case law. Part ill also
explains why California needs to have an express exception that would
allow a lawyer to prevent a client's life-threatening criminal activity.
Part IV discusses the nature and scope such an exception should take,
concluding that it should authorize rather than mandate disclosure and
also that criminal action should be a predicate to a lawyer disclosing
confidential information. Finally, Part V considers various strategies for
implementing an exception to the duty of confidentiality. After first
discussing the several previous attempts to modify the statutory duty of
confidentiality through a rule of professional conduct, it concludes that
the preferred approach is to transfer the duty from the statute, where it
currently resides, to a rule and create exceptions to the rule.

Il. THE MODEL RULES, ETHICS 2000, AND THE RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LA WYERS: EXCEPTIONS TO THE DUTY OF
CONFIDENTIALITY

The duty of confidentiality is one of the core duties lawyers owe to
their clients, the performance of which permits an effective lawyer-client
relationship, which in tum is central to the effective operation of our
adversarial legal system. The duty of confidentiality operates to create a
relationship of trust between client and lawyer: if the client feared the
lawyer would later reveal the client's information, the client would not
provide the kind of information-often damaging to the client's case-
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the lawyer requires to adequately advise or to zealously advocate for the
client. 7
Given its central role in our legal system, it might be expected that the
duty would be absolute; only where a client was assured that his
communications with his lawyer were sacrosanct would the client
disclose damaging or embarrassing information to the lawyer. Indeed,
California's duty of confidentiality, set out in the Business and
Professions Code section 6068(e), is, by its express terms, absolute. 8 It
provides no exceptions to its stated duty. Other jurisdictions, however,
have adopted exceptions to the duty of confidentiality. This Part
discusses the exceptions to the duty of confidentiality that other
jurisdictions have adopted, as well as revisions to those exceptions
proposed by the recently-published Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers and the Ethics 2000 Commission. While a number
of exceptions are described, the focus will be on the character and scope
of the exception concerning life-threatening activity by a client.
At present, all of the states except California have adopted either the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) or the ABA
Model Code of Professional Responsibility (ABA Code) in some form. 9
7. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 4 (2001) ("A
fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the lawyer maintain
confidentiality of information relating to the representation. The client is thereby
encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or
legally damaging subject matter.").
A note is in order concerning the nomenclature the author applies throughout this
Article. References to the "current" Model Rules refer to the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct as adopted by the ABA in 1983, and later adopted by over forty
states, some with modifications, as those states' code of lawyer ethics. This distinction
is drawn because in February, 2002, at the ABA's 2002 mid-year meeting, the ABA
House of Delegates voted to approve all of the rules, as amended, that the Ethics 2000
Commission submitted for approval. Together with the rules the House of Delegates had
approved at the ABA's August 2001 annual meeting, the House of Delegates had voted
on all of the proposed revised rules the Ethics 2000 Commission had submitted for its
consideration with the exception of Rules 5.5 and 8.5, whose consideration was withheld
pending their review by the ABA's Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice. See Ctr.
for Prof! Responsibility, American Bar Ass'n, Ethics 2000-February 2000 Repon
(Feb. 2002), at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-202report_summ.html [hereinafter Ethics
2000]; see also Conference Repon: ABA Midyear Meeting, 18 ABA LAWYERS MANUAL
ON PROF'L CONDUCT, 99-100 (2002). In one sense, then, because the House of
Delegates is the policy-making body of the ABA, the rules the House approved in
August 2001 and February 2002 arguably are the current Model Rules. However, as no
state has yet adopted this recently-approved version of the Model Rules, the 1983 Model
Rules are referred to herein as the current Model Rules.
8. California Business and Professions Code section 6068(e) provides that it is
the duty of every California lawyer "[t]o maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every
peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client." CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE§ 6068(e) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002).
9. See Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society, Inc., Ethics Rules on Client
Confidences (2000), reprinted in THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODEL
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At a minimum, these states permit a lawyer to reveal client information
to prevent death or serious bodily injury. 10 Again, only California has
no exception to the duty of confidentiality that would allow a lawyer to
take steps to prevent life-threatening acts by the lawyer's client. 11

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND
OTHER SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY 134-51 app. A (2001).
Forty-two states and the District of Columbia have adopted some form of the Model
Rules; seven states have adopted the AB A's Model Code of Professional Responsibility.
California has its own rules. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2000).
The legal profession is self-regulated, primarily through the various codes of
professional conduct the states have adopted during this century. The codes, which
generally set forth minimally acceptable conduct for lawyers, are a means for
determining a lawyer's liability for professional discipline. For a general discussion of
the regulation of the legal profession, see Kevin E. Mohr, Legal Ethics and A Civil
Action, 23 SEATILEU. L. REV. 283, 287-89 (1999).
10. Under Disciplinary Rule 4-10l(C)(3) of the Model Code, a lawyer may reveal
"[t]he intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent
the crime." By its terms then, DR 4-101 includes within its ambit substantial bodily
injury or death. Most states that have adopted the Model Rules have kept the Model
Rules' discretionary language. See, e.g., ALASKA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.6(b)(l) (1999) ("A lawyer may reveal a confidence or secret to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary ...." (emphasis added)). Some states provide that a
lawyer "shall" or "must'' disclose client information to prevent death or substantial
bodily injury. See, e.g., ARlz. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b) (1997) ("A lawyer
shall reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to
prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to
result in death or substantial bodily harm." (emphasis added)). New Mexico's rule is
hortatory in nature. See N.M. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 16-106(B) (2001) ("To
prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to
result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm, a lawyer should reveal such
information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary." (emphasis added)).
11. That California has no exception is not for want of trying. On several
occasions, the California State Bar has unsuccessfully proposed a rule of professional
conduct that would permit lawyers to reveal confidential client information to prevent a
client from committing a criminal act that is reasonably certain to result in death or
substantial bodily harm. See infra notes 238-49 and accompanying text. The state bar's
inability to push forward an exception is probably due less to an aversion on the part of
the bar's members or the California Supreme Court to such exceptions as it is to
California's unique system of lawyer regulation. Unlike other states where a lawyer's
duty of confidentiality is set out in a professional discipline rule, in California the duty is
found in a statute, California Business and Professions Code section 6068(e). Section
6068(e) provides that it is the duty of California lawyers to "maintain inviolate the
confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her
client." This sui generis professional regulatory system-regulating lawyers' conduct by
both statutes and rules-has, as we shall see, played a major role in California being the
only state without a life-threatening criminal activity exception to its duty of
confidentiality. See infra notes 72-76, 238-49 and accompanying text.
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A. Current Regulatory Regimes Concerning Confidentiality:
The Model Rules and the ABA Code

Current Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6, entitled "Confidentiality
of Information," provides that "[a] lawyer shall not reveal information
relating to [the] representation." 12 This prohibition on disclosures is
limited by several exceptions. 13 One exception is disclosure with client
consent and another is "disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order
to carry out the representation." 14 A third exception, the one with which
this Article is mainly concerned, is that a lawyer may reveal information
related to the representation "to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary ... to prevent the client from committing a criminal
act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm." 15 Before proceeding with a discussion of this
12. In its entirety, Model Rule l.6(a), provides: "A lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after
consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b)." For a discussion of the meaning
and scope of the term "relating to representation," see infra notes 20-26 and
accompanying text.
13. In addition to client-consented and impliedly authorized disclosures in
paragraph (a), paragraph (b) of Model Rule 1.6 provides:
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge
or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was
involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the
lawyer's representation of the client.
MODELRULESOFPROF'LC0NDUCT R. l.6(b) (2001).
14. Comments 7 and 8 to Model Rule 1.6, explain what is intended by the
"impliedly authorized" language in paragraph (a):
[7] A lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures about a client
when appropriate in carrying out the representation, except to the extent that
the client's instructions or special circumstances limit that authority. In
litigation, for example, a lawyer may disclose information by admitting a fact
that cannot properly be disputed, or in negotiation by making a disclosure that
facilitates a satisfactory conclusion.
[8] Lawyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm's practice, disclose to
each other information relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has
instructed that particular information be confined to specified lawyers.
Id. R.1.6 cmts. 7-8.
15. Id. R. l.6(b)(l) (emphasis added). The Ethics 2000 Commission has
recommended that both the "criminal act" and "imminent" limitations be removed and,
as noted, the ABA House of Delegates agreed. See Glater, supra note 1, at Al2; see also
infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. Model Rule 1.6 also allows disclosure to the
extent necessary when the lawyer reasonably believes required:
to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or
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life-threatening criminal activity exception, it will be helpful to first
review briefly the relevant ABA Code provision and compare it to its
Model Rule counterpart, and then consider the relationship of the duty of
confidentiality to the attorney-client privilege.
Although over forty states have adopted some form of the ABA' s
Model Rules, a number of states still look to a variant of the ABA Code
to regulate the legal profession. The primary section related to
confidentiality in the ABA Code is Disciplinary Rule (DR) 4-101. 16
Similar to Model Rule 1.6, DR 4-lOl(B) prohibits lawyers from
revealing confidential client information. 17 Paragraph (C) of DR 4-101
provides exceptions to the prohibitions of paragraph (B), including an
exception permitting a lawyer to reveal his client's intention to commit a
crime. 18 While the ABA Code still provides the basis for discipline in
civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was
involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the
lawyer's representation of the client.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2). This exception is sometimes referred to
as the lawyer's "self-defense exception."
16. The Model Code is divided into Canons, each of which expresses "in general
terms the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships
with the public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession." MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L REsPONSIBILITY, preliminary statement (1981). For example, Canon 4 of the
Model Code states, "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a
Client." Id. Canon 4. Each Canon in turn is subdivided into a number of "Ethical
Considerations" and "Disciplinary Rules." The Ethical Considerations (EC) are
"aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which every member of the
profession should strive." Id. preliminary statement. The words "may" and "should,"
implying that the statement is precatory rather than mandatory, pervades most ECs.
Disciplinary Rules (DR), on the other hand, are mandatory in character. They "state the
minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to
disciplinary action." Id.
17. DR 4-lOl(B) provides:
(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-IOI(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or of
a third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
Id. DR 4-lOl(B) (footnotes omitted).
18. DR 4-IOI(C) provides:
(C) A lawyer may reveal:
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients
affected, but only after a full disclosure to them.
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or
required by law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information
necessary to prevent the crime.
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seven states, the trend among states is to adopt the Model Rules.
Therefore, given the stated purpose of the ABA's Ethics 2000
Commission-to evaluate and identify rules among the current Model
Rules that may require revision 19-the focus of the ensuing discussion
will be on the Model Rules.
The duty to protect "information relating to representation of a client"
in Model Rule 1.6 is somewhat broader than the duty of confidentiality
under the ABA Code's DR 4-101, which concerns only a client's
"confidences" and "secrets." DR 4-101 defines "confidence" as
"information protected by the attorney-client privilege."20 It defines
"secret" as "other information gained in the professional relationship that
the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which
would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the
client,"21 which by its terms is not limited to information learned from
the client.
Unlike the ABA Code, the Model Rules adopted a single standard for
information the lawyer must protect. The terminology used, "information
relating to representation of a client," includes any other information the
lawyer learns that is related to the representation of the client, whether
subject to the attorney-client privilege or not. 22 The client does not have
to indicate whether the information is to be kept confidential, nor does
the lawyer have to speculate whether the information will embarrass or
be harmful to the client. 23 The lawyer's duty is not dependent on
whether the lawyer acquired the information before or after the attorneyclient relationship existed. 24 Nor is the duty dependent on whether the
lawyer received it from the client or from another source. 25 In short, if
the information is about the client's matter, then the lawyer may not
reveal it unless one of the exceptions applies.
One further point to emphasize about "information relating to
representation of a client" is that it necessarily contains within its ambit
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to
defend himself or his employees or associates against an accusation
of wrongful conduct.
Id. DR 4-lOl(C) (footnotes omitted).
19. Ctr. for Prof'! Responsibility, American Bar Ass'n, ABA Ethics 2000
Comm'n Final Report-Summary of Recommendations (June 9, 2001), at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-mlove_article.htm1.
20. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (A).
21. Id.
22. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
23. MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 model code comparison (2001).
Where relevant, the Model Rules contain a comparison between the rule and its
equivalent or analog under the Model Code.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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any attorney-client privileged matter. Although the concept of confidentiality
in Model Rule 1.6 encompasses both attorney-client privileged
communications and other confidential client information,26 it is important
to distinguish the parameters of the duty of confidentiality and the
attorney-client privilege.
1. A Digression: The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Duty of
Confidentiality Compared
The privilege is a narrow evidentiary privilege that allows a client to
prevent a witness from revealing confidential communications between
client and lawyer (or either's agents).27 It is a privilege against compelled
testimony. Put another way, its protection is triggered whenever a
person, proceeding under the authority of the subpoena power of the
state, attempts to compel a lawyer or party to the proceeding to disclose
confidential client information.28
The privilege applies only to
26. See id. R.1.6 cmt 5.
27. The attorney-client privilege is governed by statute in many states. See, e.g.,
CAL. EVID. CODE§ 952 (West 1995). Nevertheless, the statutes appear to be, for the
most part, codifications of the common law rule. See, e.g., Spectrum Sys. Int'l Corp. v.
Chem. Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1055, 1059-60 (N.Y. 1991) (describing the attorney-client
privilege statute as "a 'mere re-enactment of the common-law rule"' (quoting Hurlburt
v. Hurlburt, 28 N.E. 651, 652 (N.Y. 1891))); see also J.F. Rydstrom, Annotation,
Applicability of Attorney-Client Privilege to Communications with Respect to
Contemplated Tortious Acts, 2 A.L.R. 3d 861 (1965). For example, in California, no
new privilege can be created except by statute. CAL. EVID. CODE§ 911 (West 1995).
On the other hand, no federal statute or rule sets out a federal attorney-client privilege.
Instead, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide a more general framework for deciding
evidentiary questions based on a claim of privilege:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege·of a witness, person, government,
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings,
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies
the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EVID. 501; see also Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998)
(discussing the attorney-client privilege following the death of the client); Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (discussing the extension of the attorney-client
privilege to the employees of a corporate client).
28. See infra notes 250-58 and accompanying text (discussing the statutory
framework of California's attorney-client privilege). To invoke the privilege, it is not
necessary to actually be present in a proceeding in a court or other government tribunal,
nor is it necessary that a state official be attempting to compel the disclosure of
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information the client herself (or one of her agents) has communicated to
her counsel in the course of seeking legal advice (and it also applies to
the advice the client's counsel gives to the client). 29
The policy underlying the privilege is to encourage candor between
the client and lawyer. 30 A lawyer cannot adequately represent his client
unless he knows the client's side of the story. 31 Without the assurance of
the attorney-client privilege, it is believed the client would not reveal the
information necessary to enable effective representation. By assuring
the client of the lawyer's confidentiality, the privilege encourages the
client to frankly disclose information to assist the lawyer in the
representation. This, in turn, "promote[s] broader public interests in the
observance of law and the administration of justice."32 Nevertheless,
because it is a narrow evidentiary privilege, it will usually fall unless
each of the elements giving rise to it is satisfied. 33
information. For instance, depositions and other discovery requests propounded by
nongovernment, private lawyers also implicate the privilege because lawyers conduct
discovery under the general authority of the courts and, thus, state authority. A lawyer
compels compliance with a discovery request by invoking the state's authority and filing
a motion in court to compel the other party's compliance with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26. See People v. Superior Court (Laff), 23 P.3d 563, 570-71 (Cal. 2001)
(holding that the attorney-client privilege may be invoked in response to a search warrant
issued as part of a criminal investigation).
29. See, e.g., CAL. Evrn. CODE § 952 (West 1995) (defining "confidential
communication between client and lawyer,"); id. § 954, (providing inter alia that the
client only "has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing,
a confidential communication between client and lawyer' (emphases added)). The
statutory framework of the attorney-client privilege in California is discussed in more
detail infra notes 250-58 and accompanying text.
30. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 403 (citing Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389).
31. See, e.g., id.; Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1996); see also MODEL
RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT pmbl. 'l[ 7, R. 1.6 cmts. 2, 4 (2001).
32. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 403 (quoting Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389); see
also Mitchell v. Superior Court, 691 P.2d 642,646 (Cal. 1984).
[T]he fundamental purpose behind the privilege is to safeguard the confidential
relationship between clients and their attorneys so as to promote full and open
discussion of the facts and tactics surrounding individual legal matters. In
other words, the public policy fostered by the privilege seeks to insure "the
right of every person to freely and fully confer and confide in one having
knowledge of the law, and skilled in its practice, in order that the former may
have adequate advice and a proper defense."
Mitchell, 691 P.2d at 646 (citations omitted).
33. Wigmore set out the classic statement of the rule governing the application of
the privilege:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal
adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that
purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser,
(8) except the protection be waived.
8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW§ 2292, at 554 (John T.
McNaughton revisor 1961) (footnote omitted). Section 68 of the Restatement (Third) of
the Law Gove ming Lawyers reduces the number of elements, stating the rule as follows:
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The duty of confidentiality, on the other hand, while having the same
policy underpinnings as the attorney-client privilege, is broader than the
privilege. It applies in every other situation that the privilege does not; it
is, in essence, the lawyer's duty "not to gossip."34 The duty prohibits a
lawyer, of his or her own volition, from divulging client information that
is confidential or embarrassing, even if the lawyer learned the
information from a source other than the client. The duty encompasses
both attorney-client privileged communications and any other infonnation
relating to representation of the client that may be embarrassing or
detrimental to the client.35 The duty need not be triggered by another
party seeking to coerce disclosure; it is simply one of the lawyer's
paramount duties she must observe at all times. 36
This distinction between the scope of the duty and privilege is
important to understanding why there remains confusion about whether
California has a bodily harm exception to the duty of confidentiality.
The current confusion over this will be discussed in Part ID of this
Article.37

Except as otherwise provided in this Restatement, the attorney-client privilege
may be invoked as provided in § 86 with respect to:
(1) a communication
(2) made between privileged persons
(3) in confidence
(4) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the client.
REsTATEMENT THIRD OF THE LAW GoVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (1998). California's
attorney-client privilege is contained in several sections of the Evidence Code. See CAL.
Evro. CODE §§ 952-954 (West 1995); see also infra notes 250-58 and accompanying
text.
34. Referring to the duty as a "duty not to gossip" is not intended to denigrate the
lawyer's duty to preserve client confidential information, but rather is intended to
impress upon the reader the broad reach of the duty. It is critical to maintaining an
effective lawyer-client relationship for the same reasons that the attorney-client privilege
is viewed as critical within the legal system. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying
text. Indeed, some authorities argue that the proscription on discussing confidential
client information applies even when the information has subsequently become public.
See, e.g., CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.7.4, at 301 (1986); see
also State Bar of Cal. Comm. on Prof I Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 198687 (1987) (stating that a lawyer may not reveal a client's criminal record to the court,
even though the criminal record is public).
35. See, e.g., L.A. County Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 436 (1985).
36. For example, a lawyer could not disclose to a friend in friendly conversation
confidential information about a client's business that the client disclosed to the lawyer.
Nor could the lawyer be compelled to disclose the substance of the communication to a
party in a lawsuit against the client who is seeking that information.
37. See infra Part III.
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B. Current Model Rule J.6's Life-Threatening
Criminal Activity Exception

Current Model Rule 1.6 has two requirements that must be satisfied
before a lawyer may (not must) disclose information to prevent a client
from doing harm to a third person. First, the potential harm to third
persons must be the result of the client's prospective criminal conduct. 38
It is not enough that noncriminal acts of the client may cause potential
harm. This limitation prevents a lawyer from revealing activities in
which the client engages that are lawful but nevertheless may threaten
life. 39
Second, the potential harm must be imminent. The rule is narrowly
drawn to ensure that the lawyer can disclose client information only
when he or she stands as the last barrier to the prospective harm. 40 There
are other limitations on the lawyer's discretion to disclose client
information in this situation; for example, the lawyer must believe that
the harm is "likely" to occur, and the lawyer may reveal information
only "to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary" to prevent
the harm. 41
It is the "criminal act" and "imminent" limitations, however, that are
of primary concern. The drafters of the Restatement (Third) of the Law
Goveming Lawyers removed these limitations from their life-threatening
harm exception,42 and the ABA House of Delegates recently adopted the
ABA Ethics 2000 Commission's recommendation that they be
removed. 43
C. The Restatement (Third) of the Law Gove ming Lawyers

In an event long awaited, the final draft of the Restatement (Third) of
the Law Governing Lawyers44 was published in late 2000 by the
American Law Institute (ALI). The drafters worked on the final project,
which was conceived in 1985, for about thirteen years. 45 The ALI's
Restatements are works that collect decisional and statutory law in a
particular subject area (for example, torts or contracts) from the
fifty-plus jurisdictions in the United States and organize the law "into a

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

MODEL RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCTR.

1.6 (b)(l), R. 1.6 cmt 13 (2001).

See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.B.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

l.6(b ), R. 1.6 cmt. 14.
See infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNORS LAWYERS (1998).
Id. at XXII.
/
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coherent and more readily digestible treatise."46 Generally, Restatements
are objective, simply reporting what the law is generally recognized to
be. The Restatements record positional splits among the jurisdictions,
and usually take sides only when the dispute is evenly divided.47 In
addition, where the ALI discerns trends, the Restatements may identify
them and give them prominence in their black letter law.48 To a certain
extent, the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers followed
a similar path; in other areas, however, it broke new ground.
Unlike the states' ethics codes, which are largely adopted for use by
tribunals charged with applying discipline to lawyers, the Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers attempts to cut a broader swath.
Although it includes rules concerned with lawyer discipline that parallel
those in the codes, the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers also contains a chapter on civil liability for malpractice and an
entire chapter devoted to the formation of the attorney-client
relationship.49 In relation to confidentiality, the Restatement (Third) of
the Law Governing Lawyers has included terms and provisions not
otherwise found in a majority of jurisdictions. As noted, it is not

46. Richard C. Stanley, The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: Lawyer
Regulation Coming ofAge, 48 LA. B.J. 22, 22 (2000).
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., J. Denny Shupe and Todd R. Steggerda, Toward a More Uniform and
"Reasonable" Approach to Products liability litigation: Current Trends in the Adoption of
the Restatement (Third) and Its Potential Impact on Aviation Litigation, 66 J. AIR L. &
COM. 129, 132 (2000) ("The drafters of the Third Restatement [of Torts: Products
Liability] have attempted not merely to restate existing doctrine but to move it in what
they consider to be the right direction." (quoting Stanton v. Carlson Sales, Inc., 728 A.2d
534, 549 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998))); see also Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public
Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 82849 (2001) (recounting the "rebellion" at the 1970 meeting of the American Law Institute,
in which members of the Institute were able to incorporate into the Restatement (Second)
of Torts section 821C's public nuisance "special injury rule" federal court concepts of
standing, notwithstanding the fact that hardly any state had taken that position in its
decisional law). Indeed, as Antolini notes, in the years since the adoption of the
Restatement's proposed change to the special injury rule, only one state, Hawaii, has
ever adopted the proposed change, and most courts have simply ignored it. Antolini,
supra, at 856.
49. For the most part, the ethics codes all presume the formation of an attorneyclient relationship. But see, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 951 (West 1995) (defining "client"
as one who "consults a lawyer for the purpose of retaining the lawyer or securing legal
service or advice from him in his professional capacity," but not actually requiring the
person consulting the lawyer to retain him in an attorney-client relationship). See also
Ethics 2000, supra note 12 (discussing proposed Rule 1.18 entitled "Duties to
Prospective Client").
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unusual for a Restatement in a particular area of law to detect a trend and
weigh in on one side or the other. 50 Some commentators, however,
believe that the drafters of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers may have gone farther than those of other Restatements in
choosing which variation of the law to propose as the black letter
law. 51 For example, despite the usual approach of the Restatements to
synthesize and restate the law in a particular subject area objectively, the
drafters of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers have
proposed substantial changes to the duty of confidentiality as presently
set forth in the Model Rules or the ABA Code, modifying some existing
exceptions and adding some controversial new ones.
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers' chapter on
confidentiality, although consisting of several sections, is set up in a
manner similar to both the Model Rules and the ABA Code-it defines
the subject matter, sets forth the general rule, and then provides for
exceptions to that §eneral rule. The first section defines "confidential
client information." 2 The next section (section 60) states the basic duty,
restricting a lawyer's right to use or disclose such information, subject to
certain exceptions. 53 The exceptions are set out in sections 61 through
67 and include exceptions found in the Model Rules, 54 as well as a
controversial section 67 which would permit using or disclosing confidential
information to prevent, rectify, or mitigate substantial financial loss
resulting from the criminal acts of a client. 55 The exception with which
50. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
51. Stanley, supra note 46, at 23.
52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 59 (1998)
("Confidential client information consists of information relating to representation of a
client, other than information that is generally known.").
53. Id. § 60(l)(a).
Except as provided in §§ 61-67, ... the lawyer may not use or disclose
confidential client information as defined in § 59 if there is a reasonable
prospect that doing so will adversely affect a material interest of the client or if
the client has instructed the lawyer not to use or disclose such information ....
Id. Subsection ( 1)(b) of section 60 requires the lawyer to take reasonable steps to protect
the information from disclosure or adverse use by the lawyer's associates, and subsection
(2) requires a lawyer to account to the client for pecuniary gain from using the client's
confidential information. Id. § 60(1)-(2).
54. For example, section 62 allows disclosure with the client's consent, section 63
permits disclosures required by law, sections 64 and 65 allow disclosure, respectively, to
enable the lawyer to defend against accusations brought by any person that the lawyer
acted improperly or illegally in representing the client, and to resolve a compensation
dispute with the client. Id. §§ 62-65. Section 66, discussed infra notes 57-62 and
accompanying text, allows disclosure to prevent death or serious bodily harm. Id. § 66.
55. Id. § 67. Some states already include similar provisions. See, e.g., ALA.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (1999); CONN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.6(c)(l) (2001); HAW. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b) (2000); Mo. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (2001); MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l)
(2001). The majority of states permit disclosure to prevent such a crime; however, only
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this Article is primarily concerned is contained in section 66, which
permits a lawyer to use or disclose confidential client information to
prevent death or serious bodily harm.
Section 66 provides in pertinent part: "A lawyer may use or disclose
confidential client information when the lawyer reasonably believes that
its use or disclosure is necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or
serious bodily harm to a person."56 The drafters thus made two major
changes to the life-threatening harm exception set out in the current
Model Rules. First, the harm need no longer result from the criminal act
or acts of the client; life-threatening harm, even if it results from an
undertaking by the client that is perfectly legal, can trigger the
exception. Second, the harm no longer must be imminent; the lawyer
may reveal confidential client information even if the serious harm will
not manifest itself for many years. 57
That the drafters would discard both of these limitations is somewhat
surprising given that, to date, only three states have removed both the
crime and temporal limitations from their statutory adoptions of the
current Model Rules. 58 In addition, one state has removed the criminal
a minority permits disclosure to rectify a prior crime. See Attorneys' Liability Assurance
Society, Inc., supra note 9, at 136-46. The drafters, perhaps recognizing this section is
controversial, have provided for a "safe harbor" from civil liability in the event the
lawyer exercises discretion and decides not to take any action under these circumstances.
See REsTATEMENT(THIRD) OFTHELAWGoVERNINGLAWYERS § 67(4).
A lawyer who takes action or decides not to take action permitted under this
Section is not, solely by reason of such action or inaction, subject to
professional discipline, liable for damages to the lawyer's client or any third
person, or barred from recovery against a client or third person.
Id.
56. REsTATEMENT(THIRD) OFTHELAWGOVERNINGLAWYERS § 66(1).
57. Although the drafters removed these limitations from the life-threatening
injury exception, they retained the permissive nature of the rule as adopted in most
jurisdictions. Lawyers are not required to disclose information to prevent serious bodily
harm, but rather are given the option of doing so without being subject to discipline.
Along these same lines, as with the fraud exception set out in section 67, the drafters
have added a safe harbor provision with the intent to protect lawyers from liability or
discipline for acting (or not acting) as permitted under the rule. See id.§ 66(3).
A lawyer who takes action or decides not to take action permitted under this
Section is not, solely by reason of such action or inaction, subject to
professional discipline, liable for damages to the lawyer's client or any third
person, or barred from recovery against a client or third person.
Id.
58. See FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-1.6(b)(2) (1994); GA. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(l)(ii) (1989); ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)
(1993). Tennessee currently has a proposed Rule 1.6 under consideration which also
would remove both limitations (establishing that "A lawyer may reveal information
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act limitation while retaining the imminence standard.59 The remaining
states and the District of Columbia retain a threshold requirement that the
client has committed or intends to commit a criminal act before a lawyer
can make any disclosure. Of these, only eleven jurisdictions still adhere to a
requirement that the death or bodily injury be imminent.60 Thirteen
jurisdictions that specifically identify life-threatening harm as a~propriate to
trigger disclosure have discarded the imminence standard.
Finally,
another nineteen jurisdictions do not expressly mention death or bodily
injury, but do allow or require disclosures of a client's intent to commit any
crime.62 None of these latter states include a requirement of imminence.
relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
disclosure is necessary: (1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm"). TENN. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (Proposed Draft 2001), available
at http://www.tba.org/committees/Conduct/index.html.
59. See N.D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l .6(a) (2000) (providing that
disclosure or use of confidential information is "[r]equired to the extent the lawyer
believes necessary to prevent the client from committing an act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or imminent substantial bodily harm."
(emphasis added)).
60. ALA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(l) (1999); DEL. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (2001); KY. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (2001); LA.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (2000); Mo. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4l.6(b)(l) (2001); MONT. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (2000); NEV. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 156(2) (2001); N.M. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 16-106(B)
(2001); R.I. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (2001); S.D. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(l) (1995); VT. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (1995).
61. ALASKA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (1999); ARIZ. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b) (1997); CONN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2001);
D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(c)(l) (1999); HAW. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. l.6(c)(l) (2000); Mo. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (2001); MASS. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(l) (2001); N.H. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l)
(2001); N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (2001); PA. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6(c)(l) (2001); TEX. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. l.05(e) (2001); UTAH
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (2001); WIS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
20: l.6(b) (2001 ). Rule 3.6(H)(4) in Maine, while not specifically referring to "death" or
"bodily injury," provides: "This provision is not violated by the disclosure of a client's
intention to commit a crime or the information necessary to prevent the crime or to avoid
subjecting others to risk of harm." ME. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 3.6(H)(4) (2000).
62. For example, Arkansas provides: "A lawyer may reveal such information to
the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: . . . to prevent the client from
committing a criminal act." ARK. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(l) (2001); see
also COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b) (2001); IDAHO RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (2002); KAN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (2001);
MICH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(c)(4) (1988); MINN. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(3) (1993); MISS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (2001);
N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(d)(4) (2001); OKLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. l.6(b )( 1) (2001 ); S.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)( 1) (2000); VA. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(c)(l) (2001); WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l)
(2001 ); W. VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b )(1) (2001 ); WYO. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (2001). In addition, six states that have retained the provisions of
the Model Code in some form permit disclosure of a crime without specifically
mentioning life-threatening harm. See IOWA CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-
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D. The ABA 's Ethics 2000 Commission
It appears at first glance that the drafters of the Restatement (Third) of
the Law Governing Lawyers, at least with respect to confidentiality, have
gone beyond an objective statement of what the law currently is.
However, the ABA' s Ethics 2000 Commission also voted to include in
its final report to the ABA House of Delegates a provision virtually
identical to section 66(1) of the Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers.63 Proposed Model Rule l.6(b)(l) would provide:
"A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a
client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . to
prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm." The
Reporter for the Ethics 2000 Commission explained these changes:
The Commission recommends that the exception currently recognized for client
crimes threatening imminent death or substantial bodily harm be replaced with a
broader exception for disclosures to prevent reasonably certain death or
substantial bodily harm, with no requirement of client criminality. This change
is in accord with Section 66 of the American Law Institute's Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers. The Rule replaces "imminent" with "reasonably
certain," to include a present and substantial threat that a person will suffer such
injury at a later date, as in some instances involving toxic torts. 64

At the time of this writing, there has been substantial opposition to the
Ethics 2000 Commission's proposed changes to the confidentiality
rule. 65 While most of the opposition has been directed at the criminal
10l(C)(3) (2001); NEB. CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBILITY DR 4-10l(C)(3) (2001); N.Y.
CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBILITY DR 4-10l(C)(3) (2002); OHIO CODE OF PROF'L
REsPONSIBILITY 4-10l(C)(3) (2001); OR. CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBILITY DR 410l(C)(3) (2002); TENN. CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBILITY DR 4-10l(C)(3) (2002). As
noted previously, see supra note 58, Tennessee is considering the adoption of a modified
Rule 1.6, which would remove both the criminal act and temporal limitations to
disclosure.
63. The ABA formed the Ethics 2000 Commission, formally known as the
Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, in 1997 to review the
current Model Rules and propose revisions. The genesis of the Commission was the
concern of the then-President of the ABA, Jerome J. Shestack, his immediate
predecessor, N. Lee Cooper, and his successor, Philip S. Anderson, that the current
Model Rules, as adopted by the states, had created a "patchwork pattern" of state
regulation, and some rules had "substantive shortcomings," while others had "lack of
clarity." See Ctr. for Profl Responsibility, supra note 19.
64. See Ctr. for Profl Responsibility, American Bar Ass'n, Model Rule 1.6:
Reporter's Explanation of Changes 'JI 2 (May 2001), at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2krule16rem.html (emphasis added).
65. See, e.g., William Glaberson, Lawyers Consider Easing Restriction on Client
Secrecy, N.Y. TIMEs, July 31, 2001, at Al; Henry Weinstein, ABA Considers Ethics of
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fraud exceptions that parallel section 67 of the Restatement (Third) of
the Law Governing Lawyers and were contained in the Ethics 2000
Commission's proposed Rule 1.6, paragraphs (b)(2) and (3), 66 there has
also been some opposition to the proposed revisions in the lifethreatening harm exception to the duty. 67 This Article will address these
issues below in discussing the scope that a life-threatening harm
exception in California should take. 68 Before proceeding to that analysis,
however, it is necessary to first consider the duty of confidentiality and
its parameters in California, its relationship to the attorney-client
privilege, and why California should have an express exception that
would allow a lawyer to prevent a client's life-threatening criminal
activity.

III.

CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVILEGE IN CALIFORNIA: DOES THE LIFETHREATENING CRIMINAL ACTIVITY EXCEPTION IN EVIDENCE CODE
SECTION 956.5 ALSO APPLY TO BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE
SECTION 6800(E)?

As noted in the preceding section, California remains the only state
without an express exception to its duty of confidentiality for lifethreatening criminal activity. California's lack of such an exception,
however, should not be attributed to indifference on the part of either the
State Bar of California or its membership. As will be discussed in some
Client Secrecy, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2001, at A19.
66. See, e.g., AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT OF THE LEGAL
ETHICS COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS ON DUTIES OF
CONADENTIALITY 7-24 (2001). Along the same lines as section 67 of the Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission Proposed
Rule l.6(c)(2) and (3) would provide:
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: ...
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or
property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using
the lawyer's services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has
resulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of
which the client has used the lawyer's services ....
Ctr. For Prof! Responsibility, American Bar Ass'n, Proposed Rule 1.6, at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rulel6.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2002). Proposed Rule
l.6(b)(2) was defeated by a vote of255 to 151 at the ABA's annual meeting on August
7, 2001, in Chicago. See Glater, supra note 1, at A12. After that vote, the proponents of
the fraud exception rules withdrew Proposed Rule l.6(b)(3). Id.
67. See, e.g., DAVID J. PASTERNAK, L.A. COUNTY BAR Ass'N, RULE l.6(b):
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO ETHICS 2000 COMMISSION REPORT (2001 ).
68. See infra Part IV.
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detail below,69 the State Bar, on three separate occasions over the course
of eleven years, proposed a rule of professional conduct that would have
allowed a lawyer to disclose a client's confidential information to
prevent death or serious bodily harm. Each time, the California
Supreme Court rejected the proposal. While it is not certain why the
court rejected three different versions of the proposed rule, some
authorities have suggested there is no need for such a rule, either
because the corresponding exceptions to the attorney-client privilege
apply equally to the duty of confidentiality,70 or because the public
policies underlying the exception mandate that such an exception be
implied.71 Before analyzing these contentions, it is helpful first to
describe the duty of confidentiality in California.
A. California's Unique System for Regulation of the Legal Profession
and Its Duty of Confidentiality

California has a unique system for the regulation of lawyers. Whereas
other states regulate their lawyers through their ethics codes, some
version of either the Model Rules or the ABA Code, 72 California
regulates the legal profession by both legislatively enacted statutes73 and
rules drafted by the state bar, published for public comment, and adopted
by the supreme court.74
Unlike other states where a lawyer's duty of confidentiality is set out
in a professional discipline rule, in California, the duty is found in a
statute, Business and Professions Code section 6068(e). Section 6068(e)
provides that it is the duty of every California lawyer to "maintain
inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to
preserve the secrets, of his or her client."75 Although not certain, it
appears that California's sui generis regulatory system-lawyers'
69. See infra Part V.B.1.
70. The conclusion that the attorney-client privilege's express exceptions, CAL.
EVID. CODE§§ 956-962 (West 1995), are applicable to the duty of confidentiality, CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002), is derived from analysis of
the legislative history of Cal Evidence Code section 956.5, the privilege's lifethreatening criminal activity exception, see infra Parts III.B.1-2, or from the California
Supreme Court's allegedly implied holding that the privilege's exceptions also apply to
the duty of confidentiality. See infra Part III.C.
71. See infra Part III.D.
72. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text
73. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE§§ 6000-6210 (West 1990 & Supp. 2002).
74. See CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2000).
75. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE§ 6068(e) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002).
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conduct being subject to regulation by both legislatively enacted statutes
and court-adopted rules-has played the starring role in California being
the only state without a life-threatening criminal activity exception to its
duty of confidentiality.76
Although there appear to be some exceptions to the duty created by
case law,77 and some commentators have considered whether exceptions
to the statutory attorney-client privilege also apply to the duty of
confidentiality contained in section 6068(e),78 California remains the only
state without any express exceptions to its duty of confidentiality. 79 It is
possible, however, that despite this omission, there is no need for an
express exception. Determining whether that contention is true requires
a consideration of legislative history and a landmark California Supreme
Court opinion.
B. Can an Exception to the Duty of Confidentiality Be Implied from
Evidence Code Section 956.5's Legislative History?

Perhaps the most compelling argument that there is no need for any
express exceptions to section 6068(e) resides in California's enactment
in 1993 of Evidence Code section 956.5. 80 Section 956.5 carves out an
exception to the attorney-client privilege. It provides:

76. See infra Part V.B.2; infra note 263 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Arden v. State Bar of Cal., 341 P.2d 6, 12 (Cal. 1959) (noting that a
lawyer's use of confidential client information in a disciplinary proceeding to defend
himself against allegations by client may be permissible); Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc.
v. Paladino, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906, 923 (Ct. App. 2001) (stating that a lawyer may
disclose a client's confidential information to the lawyer's own attorney to determine
whether those communications are admissible evidence in the lawyer's action against the
client); Carlson, Collins, Gordon & Bold v. Banducci, 64 Cal. Rptr. 915, 923 (Ct. App.
1967) (noting the "established principle" that use of confidential client information to
protect an attorney's rights, in this case the right to fees, is permissible in litigation
between the attorney and his client). See also infra Part III.C.
In addition, at least two ethics opinions of the L.A. County Bar Association have
concluded that disclosures are allowed to prevent a client from committing a criminal act
that is likely to result in imminent death or serious bodily injury. L.A. County Bar Ass'n
Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 436 (1985); L.A. County Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 264
(1959); see infra Part III.D.
78. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Privilege and Confidentiality in California, 28
U.C. DAVIS. L. REv. 367, 378-96 (1995) (discussing whether section 956.5 of the
California Evidence Code impliedly created an exception to Business and Professions
Code section 6068(e)'s duty of confidentiality). Professor Zacharias concluded it did
not. Id. at 396. His analysis is discussed more fully, infra Part III.B.2.
79. See Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society, Inc., supra note 9, at 136-46
(showing that every state except California has adopted either the Model Rules or the
Model Code and thus every other state has express exceptions to the duty of
confidentiality).
80. 1993 Cal. Stat. 982, § 8 (codified at CAL. Evm. CODE§ 956.5 (West 1995)).

328

[VOL. 39: 307, 2002]

California's Duty of Confidentiality
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

There is no privilege under this article if the lawyer reasonably believes that
disclosure of any confidential communication relating to representation of a
client is necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm. 81

Evidence Code section 956.5 thus appears to permit lawyers to disclose
confidential client information to protect human life.
As already noted, however, the attorney-client privilege is not
coterminous with the duty of confidentiality,82 causing some California
lawyers to question whether section 956.5 impliedly created an
exception to the confidentiality duty in Business and Professions Code
section 6068(e). 83 A number of arguments qave been advanced in favor
of both positions.
1. Pro: The Legislative History of Evidence Code Section 956.5
Demonstrates Legislative Intent to Create an Exception to
Business and Professions Code Section 6068(e)

First, pointing to Evidence Code section 956.5' s language, there are
those who argue that section 956.5 demonstrates legislative intent to
override Business and Professions Code section 6068(e) not only in the
evidentiary context, but also in more general situations. 84 Unlike other
exceptions to the attorney-client privilege, Evidence Code section 956.5
is applicable only if the lawyer "reasonably believes" that disclosure is
necessary. It provides a lawyer with a threshold standard for exercising

81. CAL. EVID. CODE§ 956.5 (West 1995).
82. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text. To restate briefly, the duty of
confidentiality is broader than the attorney-client privilege. See Goldstein v. Lees, 120
Cal. Rptr. 253, 257 n.5 (Ct. App. 1975). The attorney-client privilege is a narrow
evidentiary privilege intended to protect client-lawyer confidential communications from
compelled disclosure in the courtroom. The duty of confidentiality applies to lawyers
both inside and outside the courtroom, and protects not only information communicated
by the client, but also information the lawyer has learned from other sources in
representing the client (including, for example, the lawyer's own investigation of the
matter).
83. See, e.g., Jeffrey P. Kerrane, Will Tarasoff Liability Be Extended to Attorneys
in Light of New California Evidence Code Section 956.5?, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
825, 832-33 (1995); see also STATE BAR OF CAL. OFF1CE OF PROF'L COMPETENCE,
PLANNING & DEV., REQUEST TIIAT THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA APPROVE
PROPOSED RULE 3-100 OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA AND MEMORANDUM AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS IN EXPLANATION 3-4
(1998) (recognizing the difference of opinion among members of the bar). But cf.
Zacharias, supra note 78, at 378-97.
84. Zacharias, supra note 78, at 378-97.
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her discretion; the lawyer can disclose confidential client information
only if she has a reasonable belief that such a disclosure is necessary to
prevent the threatened consequences of the client's acts. None of the
other exceptions to California's attorney-client privilege have similar
language; they are all absolute. 85 Moreover, "reasonably believes" is
virtually identical to the language used by the ABA ethics codes in
carving out a lawyer's discretionary exception to the duty of
confidentiality. 86 The use of this threshold-standard language thus might
suggest a legislative intent to allow lawyers to prospectively prevent
client conduct that will likely result in serious bodily harm by
threatening disclosure of confidential information, in addition to
allowing them to testify when compelled. 87
Second, the legislative history of California's Senate Bill 645 contains
express references to Business and Professions Code section 6068(e).
These references, in two separate California Assembly Committee
reports, suggest, some might argue, that the legislators who voted for the
bill contemplated that the exception contained in Evidence Code section
956.5 would override the strict confidentiality duty contained in
Business and Professions Code section 6068(e). 88 Each committee
report states: "Business and Professions Code section 6068(e) requires
attorneys to 'maintain inviolate the confidence, at every peril to himself
or herself,' of his or her client. " 89 In each report, this sentence is
immediately followed with an explanation of Evidence Code section
956.5's significance, noting for example, that disclosure of imminent
client criminal conduct would be "permissive."90 The juxtaposition of
85. Other exceptions or exclusions to the attorney-client privilege are not qualified
by similar "reasonably believes" language. See, e.g., CAL. Evm. CODE § 956 (West
1995) ("There is no privilege under this article if the services of the lawyer were sought
or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit a crime or a fraud."); id.
§ 958 ("There is no privilege under this article as to a communication relevant to an issue
of breach, by the lawyer or by the client, of a duty arising out of the lawyer-client
relationship.").
86. For example, Model Rule l.6(b)(I) provides, "A lawyer may reveal such
information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary ... to prevent the
client from committing a criminal act." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.6(b)(I)
(2001) (emphasis added); see also REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS§ 67 (1998).
87. But see infra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
88. See Assembly Comm. Report on SB 645, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (Cal. Aug. 25,
1993); Assembly Comm. Report on SB 645, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (Cal. Aug. 18, 1993);
Kerrane, supra note 83, at 832-33.
89. Assembly Comm. Report on SB 645 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (Cal. Aug. 25, 1993);
Assembly Comm. Report on SB 645 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (Cal. Aug. 18, 1993).
90. Both of the cited committee reports follow the foregoing sentence with the
following observations:
The proposed statutory exception to the privilege raises the following issues:
a) There is no requirement that the attorney reveal the imminent criminal
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these observations to a reference to Business and Professions Code
section 6068(e), even though neither report expressly states that
Evidence Code section 956.5 will override Business and Professions Code
section 6068(e), could therefore suggest that legislators believed they were
modifying Business and Professions Code section 6068(e)'s duty of
confidentiality and not just the more narrow attorney-client privilege.91
conduct of a client. The provision is entirely permissive.
b) The proposed provision does not state to whom the disclosure may, or shall,
be made. There is no requirement that a clearly identified victim be warned.
Nor is there any requirement that law enforcement be informed.
c) Should the exception to the privilege be limited to instances of death or
substantial bodily harm? Should confidentially obtained knowledge of massive
financial fraud be subject to disclosure? Electoral fraud? Widespread illegal
dumping of toxic waste? Drug smuggling?
The proposal is well-motivated. Clearly ... , it may be forcefully argued that
attorneys have some obligation to protect other members of society from
violent criminal conduct.
Assembly Comm. Report on SB 645 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (Cal. Aug. 25, 1993); Assembly
Comm. Report on SB 645 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (Aug. 18, 1993).
91. Some have even argued that the legislative history of section 956.5 also
demonstrates legislative intent not only to carve out an exception to the duty of
confidentiality, but also to create an obligatory duty to disclose. See Michael A.
Backstrom, Unveiling the Truth when It Matters Most: Implementing the Tarasoff Duty
for California's Attorneys, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 139, 152-53 (1999); Kerrane, supra note
83, at 832-33. As Mr. Backstrom explains, S.B. 645 was an attorney disciplinary bill
addressing several issues of attorney regulation. S.B. 645, 1993-94 Reg. Sess., (Cal.
1993-94). The bill, as originally introduced, provided for an alternative dispute
resolution mechanism within the state bar to resolve client complaints against lawyers
that do not warrant discipline, defined the composition and powers of the state bar's
grievance panel, expanded the number of state bar hearing judges, and re-established a
pilot project requiring lawyers to read and sign papers in civil cases testifying to their
accuracy. Id. When proposed section 956.5 was subsequently added, it contained a safe
harbor provision, exempting lawyers from civil liability in the event the lawyer declined
to reveal client confidences. Id. (as amended May 12, 1993). Sharp criticism of this
provision appeared in an Assembly Committee report dated August 18, 1993. The report
noted that the safe harbor provision would treat lawyers differently from
psychotherapists, who are not similarly protected:
This immunity departs from the law that governs psychotherapists under
similar circumstances. Evidence Code Section 1010 et. seq. creates a
psychotherapist-patient privilege. However, Civil Code Section 43.92 does not
immunize a psychotherapist who fails to warn (the potential victim and a law
enforcement agency) of a serious threat of physical violence against a
reasonably identifiable victim or victims.
Assembly Comm. Report on SB 645, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (Cal. Aug. 18, 1993). The
report then added, "It is not clear why attorneys should not be held to a similar standard
of conduct." Id. Fifteen days after this report appeared, the provision was removed from
the bill. S.B. 645, 1993-94 Reg. Sess., (Cal. 1993-94) (as amended Sept. 2, 1993).
Mr. Backstrom has argued that "[s]uch a measure in the wake of criticism indicated a
strong legislative intent to impose civil liability on attorneys who chose not to prevent
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2. Con: The Legislative Intent of Evidence Code Section 956.5
Is, at Best, Ambiguous

Another commentator, Professor Fred Zacharias, however, has argued
that the Legislature's intent in enacting Evidence Code section 956.5 is
hardly unambiguous. 92 Professor Zacharias relied on a leading
California Supreme Court case on statutory interpretation, Hays v.
Wood, which holds that a court can find a statute impliedly repealed or
amended "only where the two acts are so inconsistent that there is no
possibility of concurrent operation, or where the later provision gives
undebatable evidence of an intent to supersede the earlier."93
Professor Zacharias posited three arguments to satisfy the Hays
prerequisites: (1) the legislative history for Evidence Code section 956.5
expressed clear intent to amend a previous, related law; (2) previous
legislative action demonstrates a clearly implied legislative intent; and
(3) the statutes are so contradictory that an exception has to be implied. 94
a. The Legislative History Does Not Express a Clear Intent to Amend
Business and Professions Code Section 6068(e)

With respect to Senate Bill 645's legislative history, for which
California courts require "undebatable evidence of an intent to supersede
the earlier [statute],"95 Professor Zacharias noted that it is at best
"murky," and discussed the contradictory language in both the
committee reports and in the statute itself. 96 While it is possible that the
harm, thus creating an obligatory duty of disclosure." Backstrom, supra note 91, at 152.
Although this argument is persuasive, it does not necessarily demonstrate an
unmistakable intent by the legislature to override section 6068(e). Indeed, a subsequent
Assembly Committee report, dated only eight days later, removed the language
criticizing the safe harbor provision on which this argument so heavily relies. See
Assembly Comm. Report on SB 645, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (Cal. Aug. 25, 1993). Further,
the subsequent report expressly continues to caution readers that "[t]here is no
requirement that the attorney reveal the imminent criminal conduct of a client. The
provision is entirely permissive." Id. The August 25, I 993 report was the last to address
whether disclosure would be mandatory or permissive. The express cautionary language
in that report militates against an interpretation establishing a duty for lawyers, along the
lines of psychotherapists, to disclose life-threatening criminal activity of their clients.
See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text (arguing that a life-threatening criminal
activity exception to the duty of confidentiality should be permissive in nature).
92. See Zacharias, supra note 78, at 380-97.
93. 603 P.2d 19, 24 (Cal. 1979) (emphasis added).
94. Zacharias, supra note 78, at 381.
95. Hays, 603 P.2d at 24.
96. Zacharias, supra note 78, at 353-85. In this regard, the Assembly report does
make mention of section 6068(e) and refers to a Los Angeles case in which a law firm's
client had threatened a judge but the firm felt constrained from disclosing the
information by section 6068(e). Both of these references suggest that the legislature
intended to modify section 6068(e). See Assembly Comm. Report on SB 645, 1993-94
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legislature confused the privilege with the duty of confidentiality and
may have thought it was addressing Business and Professions Code
section 6068(e) in its enactment of Evidence Code section 956.5, this
does not meet the "undebatable evidence,, standard of Hays. Indeed, as
Professor Zacharias noted, there are signs that argue against such a
conclusion.
For example, Senate Bill 645 was a bill addressing several areas of
lawyer discipline, of which Evidence Code section 956.5 was only a
part. The legislature did amend other sections of the Business and
Professions Code. If it intended to modify section 6068(e), why did it
not do so? Further, the language of Evidence Code section 956.5 itself
argues against modification of Business and Professions Code section
6068(e); the section begins, "There is no privilege under this article,,, 97
thus limiting its effect to the article of the Evidence Code containing the
attorney-client privilege.98 The Evidence Code section thus appears to
be targeted at the attorney-client privilege, not the duty of
confidentiality.
b. The Legislative Intent Cannot Be Inferred from the Confused History
of Privilege and Confidentiality in California

The second argument that would satisfy the Hays prerequisites is that
notwithstanding the "privilege" language in Evidence Code section
956.5, it is possible that California authorities have always equated the
privilege with confidentiality. Thus, we might be able to infer
legislative intent from the history of privilege and confidentiality in
California, if not from the express language of Evidence Code section
956.5 or its legislative history. 99
Reg. Sess. (Cal. Aug. 25, 1993); Assembly Comm. Report on SB 645, 1993-94 Reg.
Sess. (Cal. Aug. 18, 1993); see also supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
97. CAL. EVID. CODE§ 956.5 (West 1995).
98. Zacharias, supra note 78, at 385. Moreover, the report's discussion mentions
that the language of section 956.5 runs counter to People v. Clark, 789 P.2d 127, 152
(Cal. 1990), which had stated that "[n]o express exception to the attorney-client privilege
exists for threats of future criminal conduct." Assembly Comm. Report on SB 645, 199394 Reg. Sess. (Cal. Aug. 25, 1993) (emphasis added). In short, some legislators may
have voted for Evidence Code section 956.5 simply to overrule Clark's interpretation of
the attorney-client privilege and not to modify the duty of confidentiality to allow
lawyers to prevent their clients from committing life-threatening crimes. Zacharias,
supra note 78, at 385-86.
99. Zacharias, supra note 78, at 386-92. Professor Zacharias considered several
arguments that might support a finding of implied legislative intent, only some of
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For example, as Professor Zacharias noted, California appears to be
alone among the states in referring to "confidential information" in its
version of the attorney-client privilege. 100 In addition, although Evidence
Code section 952 defines "confidential communication" as "information
transmitted between a client and his or her lawyer ... [that] includes a
legal opinion formed and the advice given by the lawyer," 101 section
6068(e), unlike other states' ethics codes, does not itself contain a
definition of "confidential information." 102 This might suggest that the
legislature intended that lawyers look to the Evidence Code's definition
of confidential information to determine the scope of the lawyer's duty
of confidentiality. 103
Further, the California Supreme Court's rejection of a proposed Rule
3-100 that would have provided an exception to the duty of
confidentiality for life-threatening criminal activity also argues for
implied intent. Aware of that rejection, based at least in part on the
court's concern that it would have trespassed on the legislature's sole
authority to amend the statutory privilege, 104 we might infer that the
which are discussed here.
I 00. Id. at 387-88.
101. CAL. Evm. CODE§ 952 (West 1995).
102. For example, Model Code, Rule 4-10 I (A) defines "confidence" and "secret" as
follows:
"Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege
under applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information gained in the
professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the
disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be
detrimental to the client.
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBILITY DR 4-10 I (A) (1981 ). Business and Professions
Code section 6068(e) also refers to "confidence" (as opposed to "confidences") and
"secrets," but does not define either term. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West
1990 & Supp. 2002). California ethics opinions have viewed "confidence" to mean that
a lawyer "may not do anything to breach the trust reposed in him or her by the client,"
while preserving secrets means not revealing anything "gained in the professional
relationships ... the disclosure [of] which would be embarrassing and would be likely to
be detrimental to the client." See, e.g., State Bar of Cal. Comm. on Prof I Responsibility
& Conduct, Formal Op. 1986-87 (1987). But cf L.A. County Bar Ass'n Comm. on
Legal Ethics, Formal Op. 436 (1985), (adopting the Model Code definition of
"confidence" and "secrets" contained in DR 4-IOI(A)). See infra notes 152-55 and
accompanying text.
103. That there may be confusion in the California law of confidentiality can be
seen in a number of cases in which the courts themselves appear to have equated
privilege with confidentiality. See, e.g., Zacharias, supra note 78, at 389-90, n.75; see
also infra notes 115-50 and accompanying text.
104. The supreme court's rejection of the proposed rule appears to have been tied to
its concern that adopting such an exception to the duty of confidentiality would trespass
on the legislature's prerogative to amend the attorney-client privilege that has been
codified from the common law. In a June 1988 letter to the then-President of the State
Bar of California regarding proposed Rule 3-lOO's exceptions to confidentiality, the
California Supreme Court wrote:
Regarding proposed Rule 3-1 OO(C)(3) (Duty to Maintain Client Confidence
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legislature's 1993 amendment of the Evidence Code to create the lifethreatening criminal act exception to the attorney-client privilege was
intended to treat privilege and confidentiality with a single stroke, thus
appearing to address both the privilege and the supreme court's
demonstrated reluctance to revise the duty of confidentiality. 105
As Professor Zacharias points out, however, the supreme court's
declining to adopt a confidentiality exception in the face of the Evidence
Code would have emphasized to the legislature the confusion inherent in
the area of privilege and confidentiality. 106 Should not the legislature
have been expected to address the issue head-on and expressly state its
intent that section 6068(e) be read in concert with section 956.5? The
legislature's failure to rectify or clarify the confusion thus argues against
implying an exception to the duty of confidentiality. 107
c. The Irreconcilable Contradiction Between Evidence Code Section
956.5 and Business and Professions Code Section 6068(e) Does Not
Warrant Their Hannonization to Remove the Inconsistency
If, as discussed, there is no clearly expressed or clearly implied
legislative intent to place limits on Business and Professions Code
section 6068(e)'s duty of confidentiality by the amendments to Evidence
and Secrets Inviolate), in what context does it allow for disclosure of otherwise
privileged attorney-client information? To the extent it permits disclosure in a
judicial proceeding where no statutory exception to the privilege exists, it may
be inconsistent with, or contravene the Legislature's intent underlying
Evidence Code section 950 et seq. (Cf. Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11
Cal.3d 531, 539-540.) Where the Legislature has codified, and revised, or
supplanted privileges previously available at common law, does the court have
inherent authority to modify this statutory privilege?
STAIB BAR OF CAL. OFFICE OF PROF'L COMPETENCE, PLANNING & DEV., supra note 83, at
10-11 (quoting Letter from California Supreme Court, to Terry Anderlini, President,
State Bar of California (June 9, 1998)). The court thus appears to have viewed any
change to the duty of confidentiality as overreaching its authority. That, however, may
be too broad a reading of the court's letter. See infra notes 247-72 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Rule 3-lOO's history and its implications for implementing a lifethreatening criminal activity exception.
105. Zacharias, supra note 78, at 390.
106. Id. at 390-91.
107. This is particularly true with respect to the California Evidence Code, which
contains language in section 911 that expressly limits privileges to those created by
statute. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 911 (West 1995). The California Supreme Court has
interpreted section 911 to strictly prohibit judges from implying ''unwritten exceptions to
existing statutory privilege." Roberts v. City of Palmdale, 853 P.2d 496, 501 (Cal.
1993). For a full discussion of this argument, see Zacharias, supra note 78, at 391.
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Code section 956.5, then there is a third possibility supporting a
harmonization of the two statutes: the sections are so contradictory in
their terms that courts would be justified to infer an exception to remove
.
·
108
t h e mconszstency.
The initial question is whether the two sections are irreconcilable as
they stand.
Professor Zacharias suggests not.
First, the 1993
amendment to Evidence Code section 956.5 can "be viewed as providing
litigants-the victim or a prosecutor-with access to probative evidence
after the occurrence of third-party harm." 109 Put another way, the
litigant who seeks disclosure of the confidential information would be
provided with evidence in the form of confidential information that the
policies underlying the privilege would otherwise protect from
compelled disclosure. The reason disclosure is allowed is because the
client, having committed the crime, "is not entitled to secrecy at all." 110
Implicit in this interpretation of Evidence Code section 956.5 is the view
that the lawyers may warn clients of eventual disclosure to persuade the
client not to commit a criminal act, but are foreclosed from disclosing
the information unless the client actually commits the act. In other
words, the lawyers may use the threat of disclosure to reason with the
client, but may disclose the client's act only if the client goes through
with it.'" In this way, clients who desist from going forward with their
criminal intent are not punished; only those who actually commit the
criminal act face disclosure of the proof. 112
Thus, eliminating the privilege for life-threatening criminal activity,
but preserving the protections of confidentiality makes sense in terms of
policy. When there is no irreconcilable conflict between the two
statutes, there is no further need to harmonize Business and Professions
Code section 6068(e) with Evidence Code section 956.5 by importing
the latter's exception into the former. 113 Under this view, however,
108. See Zacharias, supra note 78, at 392-96.
109. Id. at 394 (emphasis added). The idea here is that, while the lawyer could not
voluntarily disclose confidential information before the event, she could be compelled by
subpoena to produce it after the fact. Id. at 395-96 & n.99.
110. Id. at 395. See also Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487,
504 (Cal. 1994); infra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
111. See Zacharias, supra note 78, at 394-95.
112. Id. at 395.
113. Although this argument resolves the inconsistency between the two sections, it
still is not completely satisfactory. For example, the language of section 956.5 provides
that "[t]here is no privilege under this article if the lawyer reasonably believes that
disclosure of any confidential communication ... is necessary to prevent the client from
committing a criminal act." CAL. Evm. CODE§ 956.5 (West 1995). The "disclosure" is
expressly the kind that the lawyer "reasonably believes" is "necessary" to "prevent" the
client from committing a criminal act, not to "rectify" a criminal act. As for reasoning
with the client, a lawyer cannot "disclose" confidential information to a client.
According to the Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary, disclose means "to expose to
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California lawyers are left without guidance about how to proceed when
they confront life-threatening criminal activity by their clients.

C. The General Dynamics Case: Has the California Supreme Court
Already Impliedly Held that the Attorney-Client Privilege's
Exceptions Are to Be Read into the Duty of Confidentiality?
Court opinions appear to demonstrate a confusion between the duty of
confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege that is commensurate
with that of the statutory landscape.11 4 The 1994 California Supreme
Court decision in General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court115 is a case
on point. There, the court appears to have used the concepts of privilege
and confidentiality interchangeably. Nevertheless, a California appellate
court recently concluded that General Dynamics stands for the
proposition that the attorney-client privilege's express exceptions,
including Evidence Code section 956.5, can be read into the duty of
confidentiality prescribed in Business and Professions Code section
6068(e). 116 To understand that appellate court's position, it is necessary
to discuss General Dynamics in some depth.
In General Dynamics, the supreme court held that under certain
narrow circumstances, an in-house lawyer can bring a retaliatory
discharge claim against her former corporate client, notwithstanding the
ethical duties of confidentiality and loyalty the lawyer owes the client.
Noting that wrongful discharge claims are rooted in public policy
considerations, the court first laid out the stiff requirements that any
employee-not just a lawyer-must satisfy before she will be allowed to
pursue such a suit. 117
view," or "to make known or public." MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 113
(9th ed. 1985). A lawyer need not disclose information to someone who is already privy
to the information. Professor Zacharias' argument would be better served if section
956.5 used the language "threatened disclosure" in addition to "disclosure." Given the
California Supreme Court's view on reading too much into the language of privilege, see
supra note 107, we should probably conclude that disclosure means just that, and not a
threat of disclosure. Nevertheless, that does not mean that the legislature has created a
statutory scheme that is hopelessly inconsistent and warrants implying an exception for
Business and Professions Code section 6068(e).
114. Zacharias, supra note 78, at 389 n.75.
115. 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994).
116. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906, 923 (Ct. App.
2001).
117. Gen. Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 497. First, the discharge must be in violation of a
public policy "that is not only 'fundamental' but is clearly established in the Constitution
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Assuming a lawyer has satisfied those general requirements, she
still has other obstacles to hurdle. Put simply, while in-house counsel
are employees and thus ostensibly can claim protection pursuant to
the policies underlying the wrongful discharge tort, the court still had
to address whether lawyers, because of their professional duties
creating fiduciary obligations to their clients, are a breed apart from
nonprofessional employees.
After noting that in-house attorneys differ from outside counsel
because of their dependence for livelihood on the goodwill and
confidence of a single employer, the court concluded that such lawyers,
because their professional duties are "affected with a public interest,"
have a stronger claim to judicial protection than their nonprofessional
colleagues. 118
Despite this general observation that a lawyer's duties are "affected
with a public interest," the court still had to resolve whether a lawyer's
duties relating to confidentiality mandate the denial of a wrongful
discharge remedy to the lawyer. After all, confidentiality is at the
heart of the attorney-client relationship, 119 and a lawyer's breach of
confidentiality will undermine the fiduciary relationship. The court thus
had to determine whether the policy underpinnings of the retaliatory
discharge claim can warrant a breach of fiduciary duties. 120
Rejecting the reasoning of other courts that had denied a retaliatory
discharge recovery to lawyers as reflecting an "adherence to an
and positive law of the state." Id. Second, the public policy that the employee's conduct
vindicated "must be a truly public one, that is, 'affect[ing] a duty which inures to the
benefit of the public at large rather than to a particular employer or employee."' Id.
(quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 379 (Cal. I 988)). Finally, the
court observed that there was a third limiting characteristic of retaliatory discharge suits:
the employee is allowed a cause of action not in the interest of preserving the employee· s
employment, but rather to vindicate the underlying public policy to protect the public:
"decisions recognizing a tort action for discharge in violation of public policy seek to
protect the public, by protecting the employee who refuses to commit a crime ... , who
reports criminal activity to proper authorities, or who discloses other illegal, unethical, or
unsafe practices." Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Foley, 765 P.2d at 373). In short, an
employee is provided a tort remedy not so much to compensate the individual, but rather
to vindicate indirectly the underlying public policy. The court stated:
An employee who states a wrongful discharge claim for having refused to join
a criminal conspiracy in violation of the antitrust laws, or for having resisted
efforts to induce him to give false information in a public investigation of
sexual harassment charges filed by a coworker, is provided a remedy in tort not
only to compensate the individual plaintiff for the loss of employment but as
an indirect means of vindicating the underlying fundamental public policy
itself
Id. (citations omitted).
118. Id. at 498.
119. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
120. Gen. Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 497.
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anachronistic model of the attorney's place and role in contemporary
society," 121 the court concluded that in-house counsel should be provided
a retaliatory discharge remedy. Notwithstanding their confidentiality
duties, 122 in-house counsel should have a remedy "in those instances in
which mandatory ethical norms embodied in the Rules of Professional
Conduct collide with illegitimate demands of the employer and the
attorney insists on adhering to his or her clear professional duty." 123
Nevertheless, an in-house lawyer who seeks to sue her former corporate
client employer for retaliatory discharge has additional obstacles not
faced by her nonprofessional colleagues.
First, a court must "ask whether the attorney was discharged for
following a mandatory ethical obligation prescribed by professional
rule or statute." 124 For example, if the in-house counsel refuses an
employer's request to commit a crime or engage in an act of moral
turpitude that is disciplinable by disbarment and is therefore discharged,
then the lawyer will have been discharged for complying with a
mandatory ethical obligation and will thus have a claim for retaliatory
discharge. 125 Such a mandatory ethical rule would allow the lawyer to
engage in nonfiduciary conduct in the interests of the public.
A lawyer, however, is not limited to a remedy only if she adheres to a
mandatory ethical obligation. The lawyer will still have a claim even if
the actions for which she was discharged involved an ethical obligation
that is merely permissive so long as:
some statute or ethical rule, such as the statutory exceptions to the attorneyclient privilege codified in the Evidence Code (see id., §§ 956-958) specifically
permits the attorney to depart from the usual requirement of confidentiality with
respect to the client-employer and engage in the "nonfiduciary" conduct for
which he was terminated.126

121. Id. at 500 & n.5. The court rejected the reasoning in three non-California
decisions that focused on the lawyer's primary duty to the client. Id. at 498-501 (citing
Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991)); Herbster v. N. Am. Co. for Life and
Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F. Supp.
116 (S.D. Tex. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988)).
122. The court recognized the "the priest-like license to receive the most intimate
and damning disclosures of the client, [and] the sanctity of the professional privilege."
Gen. Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 501.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 502.
125. Id. at 502-03.
126. Id. at 503 (emphasis added). The court, however, stressed the limited nature of
the lawyer's remedy, as "[t]he lawyer's high duty of fidelity to the interests of the client
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The question thus comes down to when an in-house lawyer can engage
in nonfiduciary conduct and still maintain an action against her client
employer after being discharged for that conduct. The court resolved this
question by first, noting that the mutual trust and confidence essential to
the attorney-client relationship can be protected by limiting in-house
counsel's resort to the courts to claims rooted in "explicit and unequivocal
ethical nonns embodied in the Rules of Professional Responsibility and
statutes," and maintainable by a nonlawyer employee. 127 Moreover, the
court cautioned that such an action can be maintained only "under
circumstances in which the Legislature has manifested a judgment that
the principle of professional confidentiality does not apply," such as in
Evidence Code section 956.5. 128 In other words, if the in-house lawyer
is under a duty to preserve the clients' confidences, she will not find a
welcome ear in the courts.
The court stressed that the "contours of the statutory attorney-client
privilege should continue to be strictly observed." 129 Importantly, the
court noted that most situations in which the in-house lawyer confronts
an ethical quandary will lie outside the privilege's scope:
Matters involving the commission of a crime or a fraud, or circumstances in
which the attorney reasonably believes that disclosure is necessary to prevent
the commission of a criminal act likely to result in death or substantial bodily
harm, are statutory and well-recognized exceptions to the attorney-client
privilege. Although their revelation in the course of a retaliatory discharge suit
may do lasting damage to the expectations of the corporate client (or, more
likely, a corporate executive) that disclosures to counsel would remain inviolate,
a concern for protecting the fiduciary aspects of the relationship in the case of a
client who confides in counsel for the purpose of planning a crime or practicing
a fraud is misplaced; such disclosures do not violate the privilege.130

In essence, the court observed that a client who uses a lawyer to plan a
crime or fraud or creates circumstances in which the lawyer reasonably
believes disclosure is necessary to prevent the client's life-threatening
criminal activity, should have no expectation that the lawyer will not
subsequently disclose confidential client information. Under such
circumstances, there simply is no privilege. By expressly referring to
Evidence Code section 956.5' s privilege exception for life-threatening

work against a tort remedy that is coextensive with that available to the non-attorney
employee." Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. In quoting Evidence Code section 956.5, the court emphasized the
language, "[t]here is no privilege." Id.; see infra notes 133-50 and accompanying text.
129. Gen. Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 504 (emphasis added). Indeed, the court observed
that "the in-house attorney who publicly exposes the client's secrets will usually find no
sanctuary in the courts." Id. at 503.
130. Id. at 504 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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criminal activity 131 and discussing criminal and fraudulent acts which are
the subject of the crime-fraud privilege exception contained in Evidence
Code section 956, 132 the court appears to have impliedly concluded that
the exceptions to the attorney-client privilege found in Evidence Code
sections 956 through 962 apply equally to the duty of confidentiality set
forth in Business and Professions Code section 6068(e). 133
But is that really what the court intended? Or was it simply confusing
the privilege that is excepted in Evidence Code section 956.5 with the
duty that is set forth in Business and Professions Code section 6068(e)?
The reason we might ask that question is because, as already noted, 134
the attorney-client privilege generally protects against the compelled
disclosure of confidential information. 135 It is a narrow evidentiary
privilege that will generally fall in the face of fundamental public
policies that mandate that the privileged material be disclosed to assist
the trier of fact in its search for the truth. 136
When a lawyer sues her former client-employer for retaliatory
discharge, however, the privilege's protection against compelled
131. Id. at 503.
132. California Evidence Code section 956 provides: "There is no privilege under
this article if the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone
to commit or plan to commit a crime or a fraud." CAL. EVID. CODE§ 956 (West 1995).
133. As already noted, supra note 116 and acompanying text, the California Court
of Appeal, Second District, in ruling that a former in-house lawyer could disclose
confidential information of her former corporate client to the lawyers she retained to
prosecute her wrongful discharge case, held precisely that. See Fox Searchlight Pictures,
Inc. v. Paladino, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906 (Ct. App. 2001). The court stated that
"[a]lthough the statute on its face brooks no exceptions, it must be read in conjunction
with other statutes and ethical rules which specifically permit the attorney to depart from
the usual rules of client confidentiality." Id. at 922. The court then reasoned that section
958 of the California Evidence Code, which states that the privilege does not apply "to a
communication relevant to an issue of breach, by the lawyer or the client, of a duty
arising out of the lawyer-client relationship," might be relevant to the case before it,
where the discharged lawyer was claiming the employer had discriminated against her on
the basis of sex. Id. (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE§ 958).
134. See supra Part II.A. I.
135. See infra notes 255-58 and accompanying text. California Evidence Code
section 901 provides that any privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, applies
in any proceeding where "testimony can be compelled to be given." CAL. Evm. CODE
§ 901. Section 902 defines "civil proceeding" and section 903 defines "criminal
proceeding". Id. §§ 902-903. Section 911 of the California Evidence Code provides,
inter alia, that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, ... [n]o person has a privilege
to refuse to be a witness." Id. § 911. Together, these sections demonstrate that the
attorney-client privilege may be asserted in a civil or criminal proceeding to protect
against being compelled to disclose information subject to a privilege.
136. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
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disclosure would not be the client's (or the court's) primary concern.
Rather, an in-house lawyer would be seeking voluntarily to disclose the
privileged information to support her case against the employer,
presumably because it would be necessary evidence without which she
could not prove her case. No party to the proceeding would be trying to
compel the disclosure. On the contrary, in a retaliatory discharge suit,
the employer's lawyers would be using every procedural device in their
arsenal to prevent the former in-house lawyer from disclosing
information subject to the privilege.
The supreme court would have understood that, on the one hand, an
employee would want to voluntarily disclose information, implicating
the duty, while on the other hand, the employer would utilize its lawyers
to prevent that information from being disclosed in open court, thus
implicating the privilege. The court, after all, noted that "trial courts can
and should apply an array of ad hoc measures from their equitable
arsenal designed to permit the attorney plaintiff to attempt to make the
necessary proof while protecting from disclosure client confidences
subject to the privilege," 137 suggesting it well understood the tension
between the employee's need for evidence to prove her suit and the
employer's desire to maintain the confidentiality of its privileged
information. 138 Moreover, the court stated that "where the elements of a
wrongful discharge [claim] ... cannot ... be fully established without
[the employee lawyer] breaching the attorney-client privilege, the suit
must be dismissed in the interest of preserving the privilege." 139
Although the court used the term "attorney-client privilege," its use of
the word "breaching" in relation to it (rather than the phrase "failing to
claim") 140 suggests it may have meant the duty of confidentiality. Its
apparent transposition of privilege and confidentiality in the context of
the case leaves the reader with the sense that it viewed the two terms as
137. Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 504 (Cal. 1994).
Presumably, the court interpreted "disclosure" to mean "public" disclosure. The court
identified what kind of measures it contemplated would avoid disclosure of privileged
information beyond the parties to the suit:
The use of sealing and protective orders, limited admissibility of evidence,
orders restricting the use of testimony in successive proceedings, and, where
appropriate, in camera proceedings, are but some of a number of measures that
might usefully be explored by the trial courts as circumstances warrant.
Id.
138. Moreover, the court expressly recognized that the duty of confidentiality
contained in section 6068(e) was part of the California "principle of professional
confidentiality" that came into play in wrongful discharge cases. Id. at 503 & n.6.
139. Id. at 503-04 (emphasis added).
140. Section 955 of the California Evidence Code provides that a lawyer "shall
claim the privilege whenever he is present when the communication is sought to be
disclosed." CAL. Evm. CODE § 955 (West 1995); see also infra notes 255-58 and
accompanying text.
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interchangeable. In doing so, it added to the confusion regarding
confidentiality law in California.
There is, however, another possibility: the court was fully aware of
what it was saying and simply set forth a threshold standard for
confidential client information that can be disclosed in such suits. The
court appears to have been well aware that where there is an exception to
the privilege, the employer will not be able to assert the privilege to
prevent a lawyer from disclosing the information. Rather, its discussion
of privilege may have been intended not to focus on the lawyer's duty to
assert the privilege or the context in which the duty to assert the
privilege may arise, 141 but rather on the kind of information that is
subject to the privilege's protection-client communications. 142 The
court in essence was stating that even this kind of information-which
courts generally protect even in the face of undermining the "truthseeking" function of the court-can be disclosed by in-house counsel
under the proper circumstances. 143
What then of information the lawyer learns from other sources, that is,
information that is not communicated to the lawyer by the client?144 The
court repeatedly speaks of the "privilege" or "privileged information,"
but says little, if anything, about other sources of information protected
under Business and Professions Code section 6068(e)'s broader duty of
141. Section 955 of the California Evidence Code requires a lawyer to assert the
privilege in any proceeding in which another party is seeking disclosure of a client
communication (as that term is defined in section 952). CAL. EVID. CODE§ 955; see also
infra notes 250--62 and accompanying text
142. "Confidential communication between client and lawyer" is defined in section
952 of the California Evidence Code. CAL. EVID. CODE § 952.
143. After quoting Justice Cardozo's assertion that "'[t]he privilege takes flight if
the relation is abused," the General Dynamics court noted that although disclosure of
client information regarding criminal acts or fraud "may do lasting damage to the
expectations of the corporate client . . . that disclosures to counsel would remain
inviolate," such disclosures do not violate the attorney-client privilege. Gen. Dynamics,
876 P.2d at 504 (quoting Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933)). That is because
exceptions to the attorney-client privilege, including the crime-fraud and life-threatening
criminal act exceptions, all provide that "there is no privilege" if facts giving rise to the
exception exist. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 956, 956.5; see also supra notes 129-30 and
accompanying text. If there is no privilege to protect such information-information
directly communicated from the client to the lawyer and therefore information generally
subject to the privilege-then the lawyer should be able to decline to "claim" the
privilege when the unprivileged communication "is sought [by another party] to be
disclosed." CAL. Evm. CODE § 955. In short, the lawyer would disclose by "not
claiming" the privilege. Moreover, the lawyer should also be able affirmatively to
disclose the communication to support her wrongful discharge claim.
144. See supra Part II.A.I.
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confidentiality. 145 Is it possible that the court did not mean to limit the
reach of its opinion to "privileged" information (including only
information "communicated" between the lawyer and the client), but
simply set a threshold for information that can be disclosed? Put another
way, can we assume that if information subject to the attorney-client
privilege, a privilege which the "judicial system has carefully
safeguarded," 146 can be disclosed under appropriate circumstances, then
other confidential client information, not directly communicated by the
client, is also subject to disclosure when one of the statutory exceptions
to the privilege is present? 147 If we can so assume, then General
Dynamics stands for the proposition that the exceptions to the attorneyclient privilege apply equally to any information covered by the duty of
confidentiality. 148
If that is the case, however, why did the court not simply say so? At
the time it decided General Dynamics, it had already considered and
rejected two proposals by the State Bar to add a new rule of professional
conduct that would have created a life-threatening criminal activity
exception to the duty of confidentiality. As is discussed in more detail
below, in 1988, the court expressed its concern that, at least in the
testimonial context, such an exception to the duty of confidentiality
would probably infringe on the authority of the legislature to define the
scope of evidentiary privileges. 149 The court was thus aware of the
145. The only reference the court makes to Business and Professions Code section
6068(e) is noting that an attorney who unsuccessfully pursues a retaliatory discharge suit
reveals privileged client confidences, "may be subject to State Bar disciplinary
proceedings." Gen. Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 504.
146. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 691 P.2d 642, 646 (Cal. 1984).
147. It is possible that the General Dynamics court was perfectly aware of what it
was doing. By referring repeatedly in its opinion to "privileged information," the court
was setting a standard for the kind of information the lawyer could use. The court
wanted future litigants who otherwise met the requirements of a retaliatory discharge
claim to understand that they could use so-called "privileged information"-information
communicated by the client itself-in making out their claims, so long as one of the
legislatively-sanctioned exceptions to the privilege was applicable. Other kinds of
confidential information would also be fair game, so long as they were at least analogous
to the privilege exceptions. Alternatively, the court may have focused on the privilege
language simply because in a retaliatory discharge suit, the kind of confidential
information to which the lawyer would be privy and which would be relevant to the
claim would most likely have been learned through a client communication and thus
would have been privileged. Other kinds of information related to the representation
would be relatively immaterial to the suit, or even may have been something the court
simply did not contemplate. If that is what the court intended, however, it should have
expressly stated its intent. Instead, its wholesale swapping of terms only added to the
confusion surrounding confidentiality in California.
148. This is precisely the holding of a recent court of appeal decision. See Fox
Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906,923 (Ct. App. 2001).
149. See infra notes 259-67 and accompanying text. As already discussed, in 1988
there was no life-threatening criminal activity exception to the attorney-client privilege.
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difference between the duty and the privilege, and the State Bar's desire
to provide an exception for the duty. The court had an opportunity to
resolve the issue by simply stating that the privilege exceptions also
apply to the duty of confidentiality, but it did not take it.
Thus, by focusing on language that emphasized "privileged
information" rather than "confidential information" or "confidentiality,"
the General Dynamics court contributed to the murkiness of the ongoing
confidentiality-privilege debate about whether exceptions to the
attorney-client privilege can be read into the duty of confidentiality.
While it is possible to infer that conclusion from the opinion, 150 it is
important to state it expressly, so lawyers have no doubt about their
obligations when determining the scope of the duty of confidentiality. 151
D. Do the Public Policies Underlying the Life-Threatening Criminal
Activity Exception Mandate that Such an Exception Be Implied
to Apply to the Duty of Confidentiality?

A formal ethics opinion of the Los Angeles County Bar Association
concluded that an attorney may be permitted to divulge future crimes
where it "may prevent immediate and serious injury." 152 The Los
Angeles County Bar reaffirmed this conclusion in 1985 by adopting
current Model Rule 1.6' s standard, which allows disclosure where a
client's criminal activity is likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm. 153 Implicit in this standard is the recognition
that the preservation of human life outweighs the duty of
confidentiality. 154 In essence, the Los Angeles County Bar concluded
that even in the absence of express exceptions to Business and
Professions Code section 6068(e), the policy of preserving human life
outweighs the policies of candor and effective representation underlying
the duty of confidentiality. 155 While this approach is attractive-it does
The legislature enacted the exception in September 1993, effective January 1, 1994. See
infra notes 264-69 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 141--48 and accompanying text.
151. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
152. L.A. County Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 264 (1959).
153. L.A. County Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics, Formal Op. 436 (1985)
(adopting MODEL RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. l.6(b)(l) (1983)).
154. See Ethics 2000, supra note 12.
155. Implicit in this approach is the recognition that the state bar, for obvious
reasons, would be unlikely to prosecute a lawyer whose disclosure of confidential
information of a client's criminal act has saved a life or prevented serious bodily harm.
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not require any statute or rule revisions-there are problems with it.
First, in Opinion 436, the Los Angeles County Bar adopted a standard
from the ABA's Model Rules. It is true that California Rule of
Professional Conduct 1-100 provides that "[e]thics opinions and rules
and standards promulgated by other jurisdictions and bar associations
may ... be considered" by lawyers to determine what ethical courses of
action to take. 156 Nevertheless, in General Dynamics, the California
Supreme Court expressly declined to adopt either the Model Rules or the
ABA Code as a predicate for retaliatory discharge claims, recognizing
that ABA ethics codes have "no legal force of their own." 157 Further,
while other jurisdictions' rules and ethics opinions may be consulted, it
is usually "in areas where there is no direct authority in California and
there is no conflict with the public policy of California." 158 In addition,
although the Los Angeles County Bar Ethics Committee is wellrespected in California ethics circles for the sophistication of analysis in
its opinions, its opinions are advisory only. 159 They are not legal
authority. It is unlikely that the Los Angeles County Bar's position on
this issue would provide the kind of assurance to California lawyers that
a rule or statute would. 160
Perhaps more important, even if the Los Angeles County Bar's
position were to gain widespread acceptance, the members of the
California Bar would still be left without clear guidance on how to
proceed. Business and Professions Code section 6068(e) would still be
absolute on its face, and a lawyer would still be unsure whether any
actions she took in accordance with Opinion 436 might subject her to
discipline should the State Bar decide to prosecute her.
E. Does California Need an Express Exception to Its
Duty of Confidentiality?

The foregoing analyses of the plain language and legislative history
of Evidence Code section 956.5, the California Supreme Court's
156. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1-lOO(A) (2000).
157. Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 503 n.6 (Cal. 1994)
(quoting l HAZARD & HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 206 (1998)). But see State
Comp. Ins. Fund v. WPS, Inc., 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799, 807-08 (Ct. App. 1999) (relying on
analysis of an ABA formal ethics opinion to set a standard for future instances involving
the inadvertent disclosure of confidential information).
158. State Comp. Ins. Fund., 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 807 (citing State Bar of Cal.
Comm. on Prof! Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 1983-71 (1983)).
159. Rule 1-100 also provides that for guidance on proper professional conduct, a
lawyer should also consult opinions of ethics committees in California, even though they
are not binding. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1-IOO(A).
160. See infra Part V for a discussion of how to implement an exception that would
provide the necessary assurance to lawyers.
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decision in General Dynamics, and the Los Angeles County Bar Ethics
Opinion 436 all demonstrate that the California law concerning the
duty of confidentiality is murky at best and confusing at worst. At
present, lawyers in California are not provided with the kind of
guidance afforded to lawyers in other states in deciding how to proceed
when their clients are involved in criminal activity likely to result in
death or serious injury. In other states, lawyers at least know they have
the option to disclose confidential information to prevent the harm. In
California, if lawyers agree with some commentators and trust that the
legislature intended Evidence Code section 956.5 to apply also to
Business and Professions Code section 6068(e), 161 or if they are confident
that in General Dynamics, the supreme court impliedly held the same, 162
or if they consider the Los Angeles County Bar Association Commission
on Legal Ethics Formal Opinion 436 to be persuasive, 163 then they might
believe that they can reveal confidential client information.
The simple fact is, however, that a lawyer cannot be certain she can
reveal confidential information in the face of Business and Professions
Code section 6068(e)' s strict confidentiality language. 164 If the lawyer is
161. See supra Part III.BJ (discussing that the legislature so intended); Backstrom,
supra note 91, at 152-53; Kerrane, supra note 83, at 832-33. But cf. Zacharias, supra
note 78, at 380-97 (discussing the California courts' "strong presumption against
inferring silent amendments to statutes" and concluding that "there is ample reason to
believe a [California] court would not infer an exception to confidentiality from the mere
adoption of section 956.5").
162. See Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906, 923 (Ct.
App. 2001); supra Part III.C; see also Roger C. Cramton & Lori P. Knowles,
Professional Secrecy and Its Exceptions: Spaulding v. Zimmerman Revisited, 83 MINN.
L. REv. 63, 125 n.196 (1998) (noting that General Dynamics "holds that all of the
exceptions to California's statutory attorney-client privilege are also exceptions to the
lawyer's duty of confidentiality").
163. See supra Part III.D.
164. A recently decided case presented a situation that could have resulted in the
first California appellate decision that squarely addressed whether the exception
contained in Evidence Code section 956.5 also applies to Business and Professions Code
section 6068(e). See People v. Dang, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
Unfortunately, the court limited its ruling to the narrow issue before it: whether, under
section 956.5, a lawyer may testify about a client's prospective life-threatening criminal
act, disclosing information which the client had disclosed to the lawyer in confidence.
Id. at 767. The court answered that question in the affirmative, but in doing so, it did not
resolve the interplay between Evidence Code section 956.5 and Business and Professions
Code section 6068(e). Id.
In Dang, the criminal defendant, charged with several counts, including burglary and
false imprisonment, told his lawyer that he would try to bribe the witnesses against him
and that "he would 'whack' the witnesses if he was not successful in bribing them." Id.
at 765. The lawyer reported the defendant's threats to the district attorney and was
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wrong, she may be subject to discipline for violating the duty.
Consequently, it would be natural for a lawyer to err on the side of
caution and preserve the client's confidential information. If preserving
life is an important public policy as Evidence Code section 956.5's
language suggests, then lawyers maintaining silence in the face of lifethreatening criminal activity as the norm should be unacceptable.
Yet it has also been suggested that if indeed the exceptions apply, the
allowed to withdraw from the representation. Id. The lawyer then testified at trial over
the objection of the defendant. Id. at 766. The defendant was convicted and sentenced
and timely appealed. Id. at 765.
In holding that the lawyer's testimony was admissible under Evidence Code section
956.5, the court recognized that there is "a possible conflict between" that section and
Business and Professions Code section 6068(e). Id. at 767. Although the defendant's
threats to "whack" the witnesses would appear to easily come within Evidence Code
section 956.5, this " possible conflict" was relevant in Dang because the lawyer would
not have been testifying in the first instance had he not voluntarily disclosed the
defendant's confidential communication to the district attorney, thus implicating
Business and Professions Code section 6068(e). The defendant, however, had not raised
that issue either at trial or in his appellate brief. Id. Nor did either party appear to have
addressed the issue at oral argument, notwithstanding the court's invitation that they do
so. Id. Accordingly, without Business and Professions Code section 6068(e) before it,
the court could limit its inquiry to the Evidence Code 956.5 issue and conclude that the
lawyer properly testified about information received in a confidential client
communication. Id.
It appears that the court, if squarely confronted with the Business and Professions
Code section 6068(e) issue, would have concluded that section 956.5's exception to the
attorney-client privilege applies equally to section 6068(e)'s duty of confidentially.
After concluding that the testimony was properly admitted, the court proceeded:
We note that the State Bar Court has held the duty of confidentiality under
Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) is modified by the
exceptions to the attorney-client privilege codified in the Evidence Code. (See
Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 294, 314,
106 Cal.Rptr.2d 906; see also General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 1164, 1191, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 876 P.2d 487 [recognizing
exception to attorney-client privilege where attorney reasonably believes
disclosure necessary to prevent criminal act likely to result in death or
substantial bodily harm].)
Id. Simply by making the foregoing observation, it is possible that the court was
declaring that its conclusion would have been the same even if the Business and
Professions Code section 6068(e) issue had been before it. Nevertheless, despite that
language, lawyers in California are still left not knowing whether they can proceed to
disclose confidential client information when confronted with a client's life-threatening
criminal activity. First, the court's language, which was not required to resolve the
appeal, remains dicta. Second, the court's cited references are confusing. The court
refers to the Paladino case, which in tum cites to In re Lilly, 2 CAL. ST. B. REP. 473, 478
(Review Dept. 1993). Paladino cites Lilly for the proposition that "the State Bar Court
'has shown no interest in such catch-22 prosecutions. To the contrary, the court has held
the duty of confidentiality expressed in Business and Professions Code section 6068,
subdivision (e) is modified by the exceptions to the attorney-client privilege contained in
the Evidence Code."' 106 Cal.Rptr. 2d at 923. Yet Lilly does not support that
conclusion. See In re Lilly, 2 CAL. ST. B. REP. 473 (Review Dept. 1993). Finally, as
already discussed, the Dang court's reference to General Dynamics provides no further
enlightenment on what that case stands for. See supra Part III.C.
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lawyer may face Tarasoff-like liability for failing to have warned third
parties who are harmed by the client's criminal conduct. 165 Whether that
kind of liability is likely to be imposed on a lawyer is questionable. 166
Nevertheless, such liability remains a possibility and lawyers should be
provided adequate guidance on how to proceed. In the absence of a
supreme court decision that expressly holds that Evidence Code section
956.5 applies to Business and Professions Code section 6068(e), a rule
addition or statutory revision is required.
Giving lawyers unambiguous guidance as to what their obligations
are in these situations is important. Yet another consideration should
also inform any decision by California to resolve uncertainties in the
law of confidentiality. Although, as we have seen, there is still some
question whether attorney-client privilege exceptions apply to the duty
of confidentiality, California is the only state in which the duty of
confidentiality does not have an express exception for life-threatening
criminal activity. This may appear at best curious to the public,
especially since California courts appear to have provided lawyers with
exceptions to confidentiality to defend themselves. 167 It may even
appear curious to lawyers as well. At the Fourth Annual Statewide
Ethics Symposium held in June 2000 in Fullerton, California, a
member of a panel on the Ethics 2000 Commission asked the audience
165. See, e.g., Backstrom, supra note 91, at 152-53; Kerrane, supra note 83, at
832-33. As nearly any California lawyer knows (and probably any lawyer in the United
States who attended law school after 1976), Tarasojf v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551
P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976), is the case in which the California Supreme Court held that when a
psychotherapist determines that a patient intends to harm a third person, the
psychotherapist owes a duty to use reasonable care to protect the potential victim,
including warning the patient, even if it means the psychotherapist must divulge
confidential information. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 345.
166. The author is aware of no case in California or any other state in which a court
has held a lawyer to a similar duty. Nearly every state that has a life-threatening harm
exception to the duty of confidentiality has drafted it to be permissive, the same as
Model Rule 1.6, so the question is whether a court would hold that a lawyer had a duty to
warn similar to the psychotherapist in Tarasoff. Nevertheless, courts have held lawyers
liable for failing to disclose the fraudulent acts of their clients, even where there is no
exception to the duty of confidentiality permitting lawyers to do so. See, e.g., FDIC v.
O'Melveny &Myers, 61 F.3d 17, 19-20 (9th Cir. 1995).
167. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. Law students studying professional
responsibility often comment on the irony in providing lawyers an exception to defend
themselves, but not providing an exception for life-threatening criminal activity that
would permit lawyers to protect the public. Although, as discussed in Part III, there may
be an implied bodily harm exception that can be parsed from California Evidence Code
section 956.5 and General Dynamics, students rightfully note that there is no case that
expressly so holds. See also supra note 164.
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for a show of hands on whether California lawyers should be able to
disclose confidential information to prevent life-threatening criminal
activity. There was near unanimity among those present that they
should.
The idea that California should have such an exception should not be
controversial. 168 The need to reveal confidential information to prevent
serious bodily harm arising from the client's prospective criminal
activity is not a situation that is likely to arise often. Every other
jurisdiction has such an exception, and there is no indication that the
attorney-client relationship or the justice system has suffered irreparable
harm. Lawyers in California should be provided with an unmistakable
signal from the supreme court or the legislature that when serious bodily
harm arising from criminal activity is likely, they may disclose without
fear of being subject to discipline. Lawyers will have certainty; they
will have the means to protect the public.
In summary, it is not certain whether we can assume the exception to
the attorney-client privilege for life-threatening criminal activity applies
equally to the duty of confidentiality, either because it can be implied
from Evidence Code section 956.5's legislative history or because
General Dynamics so held. Nor can lawyers presume that the public
policy underlying a life-threatening criminal activity exception to the
duty of confidentiality warrants an implied exception to the duty. The
law of confidentiality in California remains uncertain. There is a need
for a clear statement by the California Supreme Court or the legislature.
Before proceeding to a discussion on strategies to implement an
exception, a discussion of the nature and scope of such an exception is in
order.

N.

THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE BODILY HARM EXCEPTION THAT
THE DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY SHOULD HAVE

Having determined that there should be an expressly stated lifethreatening criminal activity exception to the lawyer's duty of
confidentiality in California, the next question is what the scope or breadth
of that exception should be. In this Section, the general substantive
parameters the exception should have will be discussed; drafting and other
strategic considerations are discussed in the next section.
168. The emphasis here is on the word "should." In identifying legal ethical
principles, California traditionally has been a client-centric state. The emphasis has been
on protecting the client. As the duty of confidentiality is viewed as central to the
attorney-client relationship and protection of the client, not even a life-threatening
criminal activity exception will be greeted with unanimous acclaim by the bar. See infra
Part V.A.
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The term for the exception used throughout this Article, lifethreatening criminal activity, answers a good deal of the scope question.
The exception should be limited to situations in which a client intends to
commit a criminal act that is reasonably likely to result in death or
substantial bodily injury. Before proceeding to that issue, two other
scope issues must be considered: whether the exception should be
permissive or mandatory, and whether the threatened harm must be
"imminent" before disclosure is allowed.
A. Permissive Versus Mandatory

As an initial matter, the exception should be permissive. It should
provide only that the lawyer may disclose confidential information. 169
No exception should create a duty that requires the lawyer to breach
confidentiality. Few states so require, and the current Model Rule 1.6,
the Ethics 2000 Commission's proposed Rule 1.6, and the Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing La,wyers similarly do not mandate
disclosure. 170 Given California's strong interest in confidentiality and
protecting the client, any rule or statutory provision should only
authorize disclosure, and any such disclosures should be made only to
the extent reasonably necessary to prevent the foreseen harm.
B. Imminent Harm

As an initial matter, this Article proposes that any life-threatening
confidentiality exception that California might adopt include the
threshold requirement that the harm resulting from the client's actions be
"likely" or "reasonably certain." This is a departure from a requirement
that the harm be "imminent," as is provided in current Model Rule
1.6, 171 but comports with the recently approved Ethics 2000 Commission
version of the life-threatening activity exception, 172 as well as with the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers. 113
169. Or, if a rule is framed more as a safe harbor rather than a direct modification of
the duty of confidentiality, then the rule should provide that the lawyer is not subject to
discipline should the lawyer make any confidential disclosures to prevent death or
serious bodily injury. See infra notes 242-50 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 38--67 and accompanying text.
171. See supra Part II.B.
172. See supra Part II.D.
173. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.

351

From a substantive perspective, removing "imminent" from the
lawyer's calculus for deciding whether to disclose confidential
information of the client would allow the lawyer to reveal such
information where the feared harm may not occur for years, for example,
in a situation where toxic waste is released into the environment. 17 A
lawyer should be permitted to prevent a client from violating the law 175
in releasing toxic waste that will likely cause serious bodily harm.
Lawyers, however, should not be put in a position where they could
breach confidentiality upon the mere possibility that the harm may come
to pass. In the case of an environmental tort, for example, disclosure of
confidential client information would be permitted only when the lawyer
can be reasonably certain that the course of environmental damage, once
begun, will proceed to an inevitable end, resulting in harm to the public
by causing death or other serious injury. As already noted, 176 both the
Ethics 2000 Commission proposal and the Restatement (Third) of the
Law Governing Lawyers have removed the "imminent" modifier from
the rule and provide that the threat to life need only be "reasonably
certain." 177
From a procedural point of view, eliminating the imminent
requirement would conform the confidentiality exception to Evidence
Code section 956.5. As noted, Evidence Code section 956.5 provides
there is no attorney-client privilege if the lawyer reasonably believes a
client's criminal act "is likely to result in death or substantial bodily
harm." 178 As will also be discussed, in rejecting the 1987 Rule 3-100
proposal, the California Supreme Court voiced its concern about
174. See Ethics 2000, supra note 12 ("Such harm is reasonably certain to occur if it
will be suffered imminently or if there is a present and substantial threat that a person
will suffer such harm at a later date if the lawyer fails to take action necessary to
eliminate the threat." (quoting language from a proposed addition to comment 6 of
Model Rule 1.6)).
175. As discussed in Part IV.C, retaining the "criminal act" limitation in the
exception is important to maintaining a strong attorney-client relationship in the face of
eliminating an imminence requirement. See infra notes 190-204 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
177. Each version of the proposed rule 3-100 also rejected an imminent harm
requirement, providing only that the lawyer reasonably believe that a client's criminal
act "is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm." STATE BAR OF CAL. OFACE
OF PROF'L COMPETENCE, PLANNING & DEV., supra note 83 at enclosures 4, 6, 9
(emphasis added); see infra notes 240-50 and accompanying text. Moreover, both the
Ethics 2000 Commission and the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers use
a toxic waste hypothetical in their comments and illustrations, respectively. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 6 (2001); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING Lawyers§ 66 illus. 3 (1998); Ethics 2000, supra note 12.
178. CAL. Evm. CODE§ 956.5 (West 1995) (emphasis added); see supra note 81
and accompanying text.
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adopting a rule of confidentiality that would be "inconsistent with" the
legislature's intent in having enacted the attorney-client privilege. 179 It
is unlikely that an exception to the duty of confidentiality, at least one
contained in a rule of professional conduct, would pass muster with the
California Supreme Court unless at a minimum it conforms to the
language in Evidence Code section 956.5.
There are, however, proponents of retaining the stricter imminent
standard found in current Model Rule 1.6. 180 Their arguments focus on
the duty of loyalty lawyers owe each of their clients. While lawyers are
also officers of the court, owing certain duties to the legal system,
proponents of an imminent standard argue that a lawyer should not act as
a law enforcement officer against the lawyer's own client. 181 The
potential for such disclosures, they argue, would weaken the bond of
trust that the duty of loyalty fosters. 182 The client should be able to feel
that the lawyer is available to provide legal advice and will preserve the
client's confidences. If clients believed their lawyers could disclose to
third parties the confidential information they have revealed to their
lawyers to obtain legal advice, they will refrain from giving their
lawyers information the lawyers need to properly fulfill their counseling
function. Clients will "withhold from their lawyers information that
clients think will be harmful or embarrassing if they suspect that their
lawyers will use that information for any purpose other than to further
the interests of a client." 183
Nevertheless, proponents of an imminent standard concede that

179. See STATE BAR OF CAL. OFFICE OF PROF'L COMPETENCE, PLANNING & DEV.,
supra note 83, at 10-11 (citing Letter from the California Supreme Court, to Terry
Anderlini, President, State Bar of California (June 9, 1998)); see also infra notes 241,
259-67 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., PASTERNAK, supra note 67, at 2-3. The L.A. County Bar
Association's motion was filed with the Ethics 2000 Commission just prior to the ABA's
August 2001 annual meeting, at which the ABA's House of Delegates considered the
commission's proposed revisions to the Model Rules. See also Letter from Harry B.
Sondheim, Chair of California State Bar Standing Committee on Professional
Responsibility and Conduct, to ABA Ethics 2000 Commission (Jan. 13, 1999), at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/selegue.htm1 [hereinafter Letter from Harry B. Sondheim].
The proposed rule, without an imminence limitation, passed the ABA's House of
Delegates by a vote of243 to 184. See Glater, supra note 1, at A12.
181. See PASTERNAK, supra note 67, at 2; Letter from Harry B. Sondheim, supra
note 180.
182. PASTERNAK, supra note 67, at 2; Letter from Harry B. Sondheim, supra note
180; see also supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
183. PASTERNAK, supra note 67, at 2.
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under certain circumstances, the lawyer might be the last person
standing between the client's actions and the threatened harm. 184
Under those circumstances, a temporally limiting imminent standard
would allow lawyers to disclose confidential client information.
Before such time as the lawyer is the "last resort," however, there are
alternatives for preventing the client's actions, such as law enforcement
authorities, the regulatory authorities of the client's industry, and even
nonlawyer employee whistle blowers.
Otherwise, lawyers'
effectiveness in counseling clients on the legal and ethical implications
of their chosen courses of action may be lost. Society in the long run
would suffer from this loss of legal advice. 185
Despite the appeal of these arguments, the public's interest in
preventing the client from following a criminal course of action, the
effects of which might not be felt for years, warrants the removal of the
imminence standard. The arguments for an imminent standard ignore
the significance of the illustration both the Ethics 2000 Commission and
the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers have used: the
release of toxic waste into the environment. 186 True, there may be others
within a corporate client, such as a nonlawyer employee, who are not so
constrained as a lawyer from disclosing confidential information.
However, the use of the modifier "imminent" suggests that the death or
substantial bodily harm will occur in the near future. 187 This limitation
is problematic because even though the harm that results from the
client's acts may not manifest itself for years-for example, death or a
debilitating disease from contact with the toxic waste-immediate
disclosure may be "necessary to eliminate the threat or reduce the
number of victims." 188 Removing the temporal limitation would allow a
184. Id.
185. Id. The L.A. County Bar Association set forth several other arguments
favoring an imminence requirement as follows:
First, there is a risk of harm to the client if the lawyer is mistaken as to the
facts or their consequence and discloses confidential information based on that
mistaken belief. Second, there is a similar risk of harm to others including, for
example, shareholders of publicly owned corporations, and a related risk of
violating the securities laws. Third, the disclosures that would be authorized
by the proposed revisions might violate other provisions of law. For example,
California Health & Safety Code § 120980 makes it a crime in certain
situations to disclose the results of an HIV test.
Id. at 3.
186. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 6 (2001); REsTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 66, illus. 3 (1989); Ethics 2000, supra
note 12.
187. The Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary defines "imminent" to mean
"ready to take place; esp[ecially]: hanging threateningly over one's head." MERRIAMWEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, 602 (9th ed. 1985).
188. MODEL RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 1.6, cmt. 6 (2001); REsTATEMENT(THIRD)
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lawyer to take necessary steps to prevent "reasonably certain" or "likely"
harm from occurring. Such a rule would allow lawyers to reveal
confidential information-if necessary-so they do not have to wait for
another employee of an organizational client to blow the whistle or for
the authorities to uncover the client's conduct. 189
Removing the imminent standard, moreover, should not interfere with
the attorney-client relationship, subverting the lawyer's role as the
client's counselor, as some of the imminent standard's proponents fear.
Retaining the current Model Rule's requirement that the client not
merely act, but instead that the client's acts be criminal in nature, should
address those concerns.

OFTIIE LAW GoVERNING LAWYERS § 66 illus. 3 (1988); Ethics 2000, supra note 12. This is
a particular concern if the severity of the effect of exposure is cumulative over time.
189. It is arguable that even with an imminent standard in the exception, a lawyer
would still be allowed to disclose a client's criminal activities that are reasonably certain
to result in death or substantial bodily harm. It would involve, however, a tortured
interpretation of the word "imminent." To include harm not expected to arise for several
years within the purview of an exception with an imminent limitation, the word would
have to be deemed to mean not only harm that is "ready to take place," MERRIAMWEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 602 (9th ed. 1985), but also "inevitable" harm that
will be imminently put in motion by the client's act (or failure to act). For example, if
the lawyer learned from an employee of a corporate client that the client has plans to
release toxic waste into the environment in the near future, which the lawyer determines
is likely to cause serious injury to the public but not for several years, and the lawyer is
unsuccessful in persuading the client to dispose of the waste properly, then it could be
argued that a course of conduct that will lead to inevitable harm will imminently be put
in motion and the lawyer would then be allowed to disclose the confidential infonnation
to the extent necessary to prevent the toxic release or the aggravation of harm. The same
reasoning would apply to a situation where the client has already released toxic waste
into the environment, whether intentionally or inadvertently. Assuming the lawyer has
unsuccessfully tried to persuade the client to report the release or otherwise to take steps
to rectify the situation, it can still be argued that the course of conduct leading to
inevitable harm to the public (here, the client's failure to take appropriate action) has
been put in motion. The problem with the foregoing analysis is that such an
interpretation of imminent effectively removes the word as a modifier for harm. The
word might just as well be removed from the rule, as already argued above.
Nevertheless, keeping imminent in the black Jetter rule, but explaining its "expanded"
meaning in a comment, might serve a purpose. Having the word in the black letter-the
part of a rule that a lawyer would read first-would signal to the lawyer that a decision
to breach confidentiality should not be taken lightly as not every kind of harm will (or
should) trigger the exception. That cautionary function, however, can just as easily be
realized by retaining from tile current Model Rule 1.6, the requirement that the harm be
tile result of tile client's criminal activity. See infra notes 190-211 and accompanying text.
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C. Criminal Act

Current Model Rule 1.6 permits a lawyer to disclose confidential
client information only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary "to prevent the client from committing a criminal act" that "is
likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm." 190 Both
the Ethics 2000 Commission and the Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers, however, have removed the requirement that the
client's conduct be criminal. Under their approach, lawyers would be
able to disclose confidential client information to prevent client acts that
are legal, as well as criminal acts. The only limitation would be that the
harm that might result is "reasonably certain."
The problem with this approach is apparent. Giving lawyers the right
to determine what is in the client's best interests, and allowing them to
take action on that determination without the client's consent, flies in the
face of the traditional allocation of responsibilities and authority
between lawyer and client.
An effective attorney-client relationship depends on the appropriate
allocation of responsibility between lawyer and client. Generally
speaking, when a lawyer's advice is sought, the lawyer first must give a
reasoned consideration of the law in light of the facts. After such
consideration, the lawyer can then provide the advice to the client to
help the client decide how to proceed in the matter for which the client
sought the lawyer's assistance. The advice the lawyer provides should be
based on the prevailing law, the particular facts of the matter on which the
client seeks advice, and on the lawyer's knowledge of surrounding
circumstances. While the lawyer can recommend a particular course (in
fact, it is the lawyer's duty to communicate with and advise the client) 191
it is the client's sole right to make the final decision regarding anything
that may affect the client's substantive rights. 192 This is true regardless of
the relative knowledge and experience of the lawyer and client. Even if
the lawyer is extremely knowledgeable and the client is relatively
unsophisticated, it is the client who is empowered to make the ultimate
decision about how to proceed.
Removing the criminal act limitation could turn the lawyer-client
relationship on its head. If the lawyer is not constrained by that
limitation, then even where the client is acting legally, the lawyer could
190. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (emphasis added).
191. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(m) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002);
CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-500, 3-510; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 14; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20.
192. Blanton v. Womancare Inc., 696 P.2d 645, 654 (Cal. 1985); see also MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) & cmt. 1.
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force the client to make decisions the client does not want to makebased simply on the lawyer's assessment that death or harm is likely to
follow .193 There are few products sold that would not, under some
circumstances, cause death or serious injury. It is virtually impossible to
make a perfectly safe product, and manufacturers often must make
decisions involving cost-benefit analyses. Reasonable people can differ
about where to draw the line as to when the dangers inherent in a
product outweigh the benefits it provides (or the profit it can accrue for
the manufacturer).
The model for, a lawyer and client in this situation has been
described. 194 The client will be candid with the lawyer because the
client knows that the lawyer is duty bound to preserve information the
client has communicated confidentially. The lawyer can then use that
information in an attempt to persuade the client not to proceed as
planned, or, in the case where a toxic substance has been released, to
persuade the client to take action to remedy the situation and prevent the
harm that likely will result. 195
In attempting to persuade the client, the lawyer may go beyond a
simple discussion of the legal consequences to point out the
consequences-financial, reputational, and others-that can accompany
a decision to proceed with the client's proposed course of action. 196
193. There are recent examples of cases where businesses have made what can at
best be described as poor decisions in this regard, leading to the sale of products that
resulted in severe injuries resulting in enormous judgments or the potential for enormous
judgments. See, e.g., Myron Levin, A History of Fiery Deaths on the Road, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 29, 2001, at Al; Ann W. O'Neill et al., GM Ordered to Pay $4.9 Billion in Crash
Verdict, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1999, at Al. It is precisely these kinds of cases, however,
that a lawyer can marshal in persuading clients on how they should proceed. The lawyer
can make the client aware that in the current litigation atmosphere, juries generally will
not accept as reasonable a manufacturer's decision to save a few dollars per product at a
high risk (or to the jurors after the fact, an apparent high risk) of death. See, e.g., Levin,
supra, at Al. This is not to suggest the countenancing of the actions of the lawyers who
represented the tobacco companies and assisted their clients in concealing information.
See infra note 201. What they did was wrong. But providing an exception that does not
require a criminal act predicate would not have changed the conduct of those lawyers,
who actively assisted their tobacco company clients in concealing information that
should have been produced during discovery.
194. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
195. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 14.
196. See, e.g., id. R. 2.1 (addressing the lawyer as advisor, providing that, "In
representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and
render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to
other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be
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Indeed, given the seeming spate of instances involving, for example,
automobiles, where the corporation has pursued a course of conduct that
has proven very damaging to the corporation, not only legally (lost
lawsuits), but also financially and reputationally, 197 a lawyer would have
a large arsenal of arguments to use in persuading the client. The lawyer,
however, will be unable to employ those arguments if the client, fearing
the lawyer will go public, decides to keep its legal advisers in the dark.
The lawyer cannot sway a client without information. For the lawyer to
obtain that information, the client must trust in the lawyer and believe
that the lawyer will keep confidential the information that the client
communicates. That, as already pointed out, is the policy rationale
underlying both the duty of confidentiality and the attorney-client
privilege.
It is not surprising that, while a dozen or so states have modified
Model Rule 1.6 by removing its imminent limitation, 198 only four states
have completely removed the requirement that the client engage in a
criminal activity before the exception is triggered. 199 Removing the
criminal activity limitation from a life-threatening exception to the duty
of confidentiality would disrupt the balance that currently exists in the
attorney-client relationship. Without the criminal activity limitation, a
lawyer would have the ability, without fear of discipline, to disclose
information about a client's lawful actions, so long as the lawyer
reasonably believes the client's actions will lead to death or serious
injury. A client's assessment of the same situation may differ from that
of the lawyer. For example, the client may have taken into consideration
that some death or injury is unavoidable, but has decided to proceed;
such business decisions are made all the time. But that would not
matter; the lawyer could use the threat of disclosing confidential
information to, in essence, make business decisions for the client based
on the lawyer's own estimation of the benefits and risks to the public.
Giving the lawyer that power would turn the fundamental allocation of
authority between lawyer and client on its head, an unfair result, as it is a
rare product that is 100% safe.200 Manufacturers often have to balance
relevant to the client's situation"); see also id. R. 2.1 cmts. 1-5 (discussing the scope of
advice the lawyer may give).
197. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
200. The topsy-turvy effect on the lawyer-client relationship of removing the
criminal act requirement from the confidentiality exception is perhaps most apparent
where the client is an organization. There is usually someone within the organization
who is responsible for making decisions on behalf of the organization. It is in that
person that the decision-making authority is properly reposed. It is not the lawyer's
place to substitute her opinions on proper conduct for those of the organization's
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benefits and risks in bringing a product to market. Such balancing is not
illegal even if the product that is marketed contains some risk. Absent a
requirement that the client's acts be criminal, clients such as tobacco
companies, gun manufacturers, and chemical companies would be denied
the same attorney-client relationship to which all persons within our legal
decision-maker. If the lawyer believes the decision-maker is in error, then the ethics
rules provide her with a road map on the course to take. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13; CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-600 (1999). The
Restatement (Third) section 96(3), has also addressed this issue in similar fashion.
REsTA1EMENT (THIRD) OFTIIELAW GOVERNING LAWYERS§ 96(3) (1998).
California Rule 3-600 is an example of an ethical rule that provides guidance to
lawyers who represent organizations. It provides that if the lawyer knows that a person
acting on behalf of the corporation intends to act (or refuses to act) in a way that is a
violation of law imputable to the organization or in a way that is likely to result in
substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may urge the person to reconsider
the matter or refer the matter to the highest internal authority that can act on behalf of the
organization. CAL. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 3-600 (1999). Paragraph (B) of Rule
3-600 provides:
(B) If a member acting on behalf of an organization knows that an actual or
apparent agent of the organization acts or intends or refuses to act in a manner
that is or may be a violation of law reasonably imputable to the organization,
or in a manner which is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization,
the member shall not violate his or her duty of protecting all confidential
information as provided in Business and Professions Code section 6068,
subdivision (e). Subject to Business and Professions Code section 6068,
subdivision (e), the member may take such actions as appear to the member to
be in the best lawful interest of the organization. Such actions may include
among others:
(1) Urging reconsideration of the matter while explaining its likely
consequences to the organization; or
(2) Referring the matter to the next higher authority in the organization,
including, if warranted by the seriousness of the matter, referral to the
highest internal authority that can act on behalf of the organization.
Id. R. 3-600(B). Model Rule 1.13 is to substantially the same effect. See MODEL RULES
OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 1.13.
These various ethical rules concerning the organization as client have a cardinal
principle in common: the lawyer may not violate her duty of confidentiality in taking
action to resolve the situation. The courses of conduct permitted lawyers under these
rules all must be taken within the confines of the client organization; the lawyer is not
permitted to externally disclose information protected by the duty of confidentiality. The
rules recognize that decisions in an organization are made by authorized representatives
of that organization; unless specifically so authorized to make decisions for the
organization, the lawyer's only course is to pursue the approved course of conduct or
resign. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c); CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 3-600(C) (1999). However, the lawyer's silence is mandated only if the information
the lawyer has in her possession is subject to the duty of confidentiality. As discussed
previously, a client has no expectation in the preservation of confidential information
where the client is involved in criminal activity. See Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior
Court, 876 P.2d 487,503 (Cal. 1994); supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
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system are entitled. 201 Indeed, it is possible they would effectively be
denied the benefits of the attorney-client privilege. And it would not just
be manufacturers of inherently dangerous products. Not conditioning the
exception on a crime could adversely affect any business that "in the
climate of the day might be involved in controversial activities." 202 It
could also affect any business whose product or service has implicit
risks of death or life-health care providers, health insurance companies,
airlines, and the like. 203
Where the client plans to engage in a criminal act that will result in
death or serious bodily harm, however, the lawyer should be allowed to
breach confidentiality to prevent serious bodily harm from resulting.
In those situations, the client would have no reasonable expectation
that the attorney is bound by a duty of confidentiality. 204 No client
should expect that it can rely on its lawyer to assist it in a course of
criminal conduct that threatens human life. 205 A lawyer disclosing
confidential information in these limited circumstances should not
leave the client feeling betrayed. With a criminal act limitation in
place, both the client and the lawyer will have been put on notice that
if the client en&ages in criminal conduct, the client cannot expect
confidentiality. 2 Conversely, the criminal act limitation will remind

°

201. It might be argued that the practices of concealment in which tobacco
companies engaged for many years is a strong argument why there should be few
limitations on allowing a lawyer to disclose confidential client information to prevent
harm. See, e.g., Richard A. Zitrin & Carol M. Langford, Ethics in Ashes: Big Tobacco's
Lawyers Hide Behind the Cloak of Privilege, CAL. LAW., Nov. 1988, at 46. The problem
with that argument is that the tobacco lawyers were willing participants in the
concealment. Even if those lawyers were operating under the Ethics 2000 Commission
or the Restatement (Third) 's rules that have removed the criminal activity limitation, they
would not have disclosed the information.
202. PASTANAK, supra note 67.
203. Id.
204. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 504 (noting that any such expectation is
"misplaced").
205. See, e.g., United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620, 634 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming a
lawyer's conviction for obstructing justice, the court stated: "We refuse to accept the notion
that lawyers may do anything, including violating the law, to zealously advocate their
clients' interests and then avoid criminal prosecution by claiming that they were 'just doing
their job'"); United States v. Morris, 988 F.2d 1335, 1336 (4th Cir. 1993) (discussing the
marital privilege in a case concerning a lawyer charged in a drug conspiracy based on real
estate work he did on house where crack cocaine was being manufactured).
206. The supreme court in Gen. Dynamics, 876 P.2d 487, appears to suggest that a
client cannot expect a lawyer to stand by when it discloses to the lawyer confidential
information for the purposes of committing a crime. The court stated:
Although their revelation in the course of a retaliatory discharge suit may do
lasting damage to the expectations of the corporate client (or, more likely, a
corporate executive) that disclosures to counsel would remain inviolate, a
concern for protecting the fiduciary aspects of the relationship in the case of a
client who confides in counsel for the purpose of planning a crime or
practicing a fraud is misplaced; such disclosures do not violate the privilege.

360

[VOL. 39: 307, 2002]

California's Duty of Confidentiality
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

the lawyer that the confidentiality exception is not a license to usurp
the client's decision-making authority.
The possibility that the lawyer will reveal such information if the
client engages in life-threatening criminal conduct should not prevent
the vast majority of clients from providing their lawyers with all the
information the lawyer needs to provide the client with competent advice
on how to proceed. Thus, a criminal activity limitation will serve the
purposes of protecting the public without undermining the attorneyclient relationship.
Turning to the toxic waste hypothetical illustrations used both by the
Ethics 2000 Commission and in the Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers,207 we can see that a criminal activity limitation
would not necessarily prevent a lawyer from disclosing information to
prevent or reduce the number of deaths or injuries. Generally,
businesses that handle toxic substances are highly regulated. 208 In most,
if not all situations where there is a toxic waste spill, regulations require
the business responsible for the spill to report it to the regulatory
authority or take necessary steps to protect the public.209 In California,
dumping hazardous waste can lead to imprisonment, a fine, or both.210
Failure to report an inadvertent spill will subject the client to civil
penalties,211 and in some instances, criminal penalties. Thus, even with a
criminal act limitation, if a lawyer learns that the organizational client
has released a toxic substance into the environment that poses a serious
threat to the public, and the client has not disclosed that information to
the relevant authorities, the lawyer could reveal that information to the
extent necessary to prevent or, in some cases, to lessen the harm. 212
Gen. Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 504.
207. See sources cited supra note 186.
208. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6922k (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
209. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTII & SAFEfY CODE§§ 25359.4(b), 25507(a) (West 1999
& Supp. 2002).
210. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 374.3(h)(l) (West 1999 & Supp. 2002). Under the
statute, the "fine is mandatory and shall amount to not less than five hundred dollars
($500) nor more than one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500) upon a first
conviction." Id.
211. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTII & SAFEfY CODE§ 25359.4(d).
212. Under the proposed exception, the lawyer would be limited to disc;losing
prospective criminal acts of the client that are likely to result in substantial bodily harm
or death. Even with this limitation, a potential problem may arise under certain
situations. Consider, for example, the case where the lawyer becomes aware through the
representation of the client that the client had discharged toxic waste into the
environment several times in the past but never reported it to the appropriate authorities,
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In summary, retammg the criminal act limitation from the current
Model Rules preserves the traditional allocation of authority between
client and lawyer. It prevents the lawyer from making decisions for the
client based on the lawyer's own beliefs. It provides notice to both the
client and lawyer that the client who engages in criminal activity cannot
have any expectation of confidentiality. Just as important, it reminds the
lawyer that he may not reveal confidential information where there is no
criminal act. 213
nor take the client any steps to rectify the spillage. Assuming the lawyer knows the
discharge is likely to cause death in the future and that the law requires the client to
report each incidence of such discharges, the client has been committing criminal acts by
not making the reports. If the lawyer remonstrates with the client but the client refuses
to take appropriate remedial action, and the lawyer then discloses the spills to the
authorities, then the lawyer arguably will be disclosing a past criminal act-instances of
nonreporting. Moreover, the disclosure of a past criminal act would be even more
apparent in a case where the client deliberately discharged toxins into the environment.
Similarly, in the bomb-planting hypothetical discussed previously, see supra note 4 and
accompanying text, the lawyer could prevent a potentially murderous act by the client
through disclosure to the authorities. At the same time, however, the lawyer arguably
would be revealing a completed criminal act, attempted murder, by disclosing that the
client had planted the timed incendiary device. Put another way, in some cases,
disclosure of prospective criminal acts will necessarily result in disclosure of past
criminal acts.
It is true that our legal system places great import on the lawyer preserving the client's
confidential information, particularly information of past criminal acts the client has
disclosed to the lawyer. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, in
those limited instances where the client's continued inaction will not only result in
reasonably likely death or substantial bodily harm (where, for example, the discharged
toxin has been shown likely to cause death in the future), but also continues to constitute
a criminal act (for example, failure to report or past deliberate discharges in violation of
law), the scales should tip in favor of disclosure. Preservation of innocent lives should
trump the preservation of client confidences in these narrow circumstances. The
exception would not allow wholesale disclosure of clients' past criminal acts. They
would be disclosed only where those past acts continue to threaten life, and the lawyer
would be able to disclose client confidences only to the extent it is necessary to prevent
the client's prospective act. On balance, both policies-protection of client confidences
and protection of life-will be vindicated.
213. The proposed exception would limit the lawyer to reporting prospective criminal
acts by the client. At the ABA's February 2002 mid-year meeting in Philadelphia, the Los
Angeles County Bar Association (LACBA) submitted a motion to reconsider the Ethics
2000 Commission's amendment to Model Rule 1.6(b) that was approved by the ABA
House of Delegates at its 2001 annual meeting. AM. BAR Ass'N HOUSE OF DELEGATES,
ADDfTIONAL AMENDMENT TO Ennes 2000 PROPOSAL (REPORT 401) (2002) (on file with the
author) (stating the proposed amendment to Rule 1.6 by the Los Angeles County Bar). In
its motion, the LACBA proposed that the criminal act limitation (a limitation rejected at the
ABA's August 2001 annual meeting) it was proposing should not be restricted to the acts
of the client. The LACBA proposed that Rule 1.6(b)(l) should provide: "(b)A lawyer may
reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary: (1) to prevent reaseaaely eertaia imminent death or
substantial bodily harm resulting from a criminal act." Id. The foregoing language
would allow a lawyer to disclose a prospective criminal act not only by the client, but
also by a third person, which the lawyer discovered in the course of the representation of
the client. This Article is not in substantive disagreement with this proposal. If a lawyer
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D. Definition of "Confidential Information"
There is a final issue on the scope of the life-threatening criminal
activity exception: it should also include a definition of "confidential
information" so that lawyers will be on notice concerning the kind of
information that comes within the scope of the duty's protection. At
present, unlike the Model Rules,214 the ABA Code215 or the Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers,216 Business and Professions
Code section 6068(e) provides no definition. Two California State Bar
ethics opinions have considered section 6068(e)' s reference to
"confidence" and "secrets" and concluded that "maintaining confidence"
of the client refers to the lawyer not doing anything that would "breach
the trust reposed in him or her by the client,"217 while "secrets" refers to
"information gained in the professional relationships [sic] . . . the
disclosure which would be embarrassing and would be likely to be
detrimental to the client. "218
is aware of a crime that is about to be committed and which is likely to result in death or
serious bodily injury, the lawyer should not be foreclosed from disclosing that
information simply because the prospective crime is to be committed by one other than
the client. This Article proposes for now, however, that any proposed exception to the
duty of confidentiality in California be limited to prospective criminal acts by the client.
As already noted, see supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text, Evidence Code
section 956.5 provides that there is no attorney-client privilege if the lawyer reasonably
believes disclosure of a confidential client communication is necessary "to prevent the
client from committing a criminal act that ... is likely to result in death or substantial
bodily harm." CAL. EVID. CODE§ 956.5 (West 1995). It is unlikely that an exception to
the duty of confidentiality would pass muster with the California Supreme Court unless,
at a minimum, it conforms to the language in Evidence Code section 956.5.
214. The Model Rules provide that the duty of confidentiality covers "information
relating to representation of a client." See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6
(2001); supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
215. DR 4-lOl(A) includes within its scope of protection both information
protected by the attorney-client privilege and "secrets." See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
REsPONSIBILITY DR 4-lOl(A) (1981); see also supra notes 20-21 and accompanying
text.
216. Section 59 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers defines
"confidential information" to mean "information relating to representation of a client,
other than information that is generally known." REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS§ 59 (1998).
217. State Bar of Cal. Compendium on Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 1988-96
(Mar. 1989); State Bar of Cal. Compendium on Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 198687 (June 1987).
218. State Bar of Cal. Compendium on Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 1988-96
(Mar. 1989); State Bar of Cal. Compendium on Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 198687 (June 1987) (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBlLITY, DR 4-lOl(A)). The
definition of "secrets" the bar adopted is the definition contained in the Model Code,
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A better definition that would communicate to California lawyers
precisely what kind of information is to be protected was included in the
1998 proposal to add Rule 3-100 to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
That proposal provided that:
"confidential information" means information related to the representation of a
client that: (1) is subject to the lawyer-client privilege, or (2) has been acquired
from any source, and (a) which the client has requested be held inviolate, or (b)
the disclosure of which is likely to be embarrassing or detrimental to the
client. 219

That definition is preferable because it combines the best of both Model
Rule 1.6 and ABA Code DR 4-101.
First, it includes the broad definition included in Model Rule 1.6,
"information relating to representation," which is not restricted to
information that is learned from the client.220 It thus emphasizes that it
applies to any information relevant to the representation of the client,
regardless of its source. Unlike the Model Rule, however, it does not
stop with the broad definition. Subparagraphs (1) and (2) spell out
precisely what is covered: attorney-client privileged communications
and information from any other source. As to the latter information, so
long as it is embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client, the
client need not request that it be kept inviolate. The definition's breadth
and specificity will put lawyers on notice as to precisely what
information they must protect when honoring their duty of confidentiality.
In summary, an exception to the duty of confidentiality for lifethreatening criminal activity should be just that. A lawyer's authority to
disclose confidential information should be limited to the client's
prospective criminal acts, though disclosure should not require that harm
be imminent. It should also include a definition of "confidential
information" that is both broad, yet at the same time, precise.
Having determined that California should have an exception and
having described the proposed scope of that exception, this Article will
now address strategies for implementing the exception.

although it redacted the clause that states "that the client has requested be held
inviolate." See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBILITY DR 4-lOl(A) ("'[S]ecret' refers
to other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested
be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to
be detrimental to the client."). The LACBA adopted the definition of DR 4-IOl(A),
which also defines "confidence" as referring "to information protected by the attorneyclient privilege under applicable law." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBILITY DR 4IOI(A).
219. See STATE BAR OF CAL. OFFICE OF PROF'L COMPETENCE, PLANNING & DEV.,
supra note 83, at enclosure 1.
220. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
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V. IMPLEMENTING THE EXCEPTION: NOT AS EASY AS IT
MIGHT APPEAR

Part II of this Article described the parameters of the life-threatening
criminal activity exception in other jurisdictions and discussed how
California has no express exception to its duty of confidentiality that
would allow a lawyer to disclose confidential information to prevent a
client's life-threatening criminal activity. Part ill demonstrated that the
life-threatening criminal activity exception to the attorney-client
privilege probably does not apply to Business and Professions Code
section 6068(e), and concluded that at any rate, the uncertainty in the
law of confidentiality in California warrants an express life-threatening
activity exception to its duty of confidentiality. Part IV considered the
nature and scope of such an exception, concluding it should be
permissive, and should retain the criminal activity limitation but not the
imminent standard of current Model Rule 1.6, and should contain a
definition of "confidential information." This Part of the Article now
considers how such an exception could be implemented.
There are several ways to implement a confidentiality exception.
First, the legislature could amend Business and Professions Code section
6068(e) to provide for an express exception.221 Second, the California
Supreme Court could adopt a rule of professional conduct that either
provides an express exception to 6068(e) or immunizes the disclosing
lawyer from discipline. 222 Third, amending section 6068(e), in concert
with the adoption of a rule of professional conduct is yet another
possibility.223
Although the latter approach would come closest to avoiding problems
of conflicting authority inherent in California's unique dual regulatory
framework, 224 none of these approaches are completely satisfactory. To
avoid the problems inherent in the dual regulatory system, a fourth
approach is suggested, involving the repeal of section 6068(e), effective
upon the adoption of a rule of professional conduct.225

221. See infra Part V.A.
222. See infra Part V.B.4.
223. See infra Part V.C.1.
224. California's unique regulatory system involving both legislatively enacted
statutes and court-adopted rules of professional conducts is discussed supra notes 7276 and accompanying text.
225. See infra Part V.C.2.
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A. Amending Section 6068(e)

The most direct approach to implementing an exception to the duty of
confidentiality is to amend Business and Professions Code section
6068(e), either by revising the section itself or by enacting a separate
section that creates the exception. 226 Professor Roger Cramton has
argued in favor of such an approach and has proposed language for such
an amended section. 227 Professor Cramton's proposal cuts a much
broader swath than the exception this Article envisions. Putting aside
the merits of the scope or the language of his proposed exception,
however, it is debatable whether an amendment of Business and
Professions Code section 6068(e) could be enacted.
Section 6068(e) has been part of California's Business and
Professions Code since 1873. It is part of section 6068, which is titled
"Duties of Attorney" and which, in fifteen separate paragraphs, lists
duties of California lawyers. In the nearly 130 years section 6068(e) has
been California law, it has not been amended. There have been attempts
to amend or modify the effect of section 6068(e), but they have proven
unsuccessful. For example, during the 1999-2000 legislative session,
Assembly Member Tony Strickland introduced Assembly Bill (AB)
1286, which would have required "a lawyer to reveal to a law
enforcement agency information regarding the location of a person
missing against his or her will, and to reveal the identity of the person
who has that information."228 Initially fashioned as an amendment to the
Evidence Code,229 it was amended on April 26, 1999, to instead provide
for a new section 6068.5. That section would have modified section
6068(e) by providing that, notwithstanding any other provision of law
(presumably, section 6068(e)), a lawyer has a duty to report to a law
226. This latter strategy was the approach taken by the sponsors of Assembly Bill
1286, discussed infra notes 227-41 and accompanying text, and Assembly Bill 363, a
bill that when first introduced proposed an exception to the duty of confidentiality by
providing that, notwithstanding their duties under section 6068(e), government lawyers
could report improper governmental activity. See Assemb. B. 363, 2001 Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2001), available at http://www.Ieginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/asm/ab_035 I-0400/ab_363_bill_
20010220_introduced.html. Both bills proposed a section 6068.5 that would have
created the respective exception to Business and Professions Code section 6068(e). See
infra note 291 for the subsequent history of Assembly Bill 363.
227. See Roger C. Cramton, Proposed Legislation Concerning a Lawyer's Duty of
Confidentiality, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 1467, 1473-76 (1995). It is not certain whether
Professor Cramton still believes such an amendment is necessary, given his subsequent
statement that General Dynamics probably held that the exceptions to California's
attorney-client privilege also apply to its duty of confidentiality. See Cramton &
Knowles, supra note 162, at 126 n.196.
228. See Hearing Before the Assembly Committee on Public Safety, 1999-2000
Reg. Sess. (Cal. May 13, 1999) (discussing Assembly Bill 1286).
229. It would have added a new section 964 to the California Evidence Code.
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enforcement agency information about a missing person and to identify
any person, including a client of the lawyer, whom the lawyer
reasonably believes has information about that missing person.230 It was
subsequently amended to take its original approach, that is, adding a section
to the Evidence Code.231 The Evidence Code amendment permitted, but
did not require, that the lawyer report to the law enforcement agency. 232
Nevertheless, it failed to gain passage in the committee and expired.233
As with the life-threatening criminal activity exception with which
this Article is concerned, AB 1286 evinced a concern for life of a third
person.234 It attempted to carve out an exception either to the duty of
confidentiality or to the attorney-client privilege. Its failure, however,
does not necessarily mean that a proposed revision of Business and
Professions Code section 6068(e) to permit the life-threatening
criminal activity exception would similarly fail. Arguably, AB 1286
was not a bill that should have passed. It was an impassioned reaction to
a notorious crime that would have unnecessarily invaded the duty of
confidentiality. Its rejection in the committee may simply have reflected
cooler heads acting to prevent the passage of a bill borne of a sensational,
albeit tragic, event. Nevertheless, AB 1286 cautions against unbridled
optimism for legislative change.
California has traditionally had a strong interest in protecting the
client and the lawyer-client relationship. AB 1286's failure to leave the
committee demonstrates this. Moreover, it points out that anyone who
seeks to tinker with the duty of confidentiality or the attorney-client
privilege in California will likely face stiff opposition. Even Assembly
Member Strickland recognized this just prior to introducing the bill:
230. See Assemb. B. 1286, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999-2000) (as amended
Apr. 26, 1999).
231. See Assemb. B. 1286 (Cal. 1999-2000) (as amended Jan. 3, 2000) (proposing
to add section 964 to the California Evidence Code).
232. Id.
233. See Complete Bill History: Bill Number: A.B. No. 1286, available at
http:/lwww.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/99-00/bill/asm/ab_l 251-1300/ab_l286_bill_20000203_
history.html Oast visited Jan. 26, 2002).
234. The bill grew out of a case involving the abduction of a fourteen-year-old girl
whose body was not found for nearly a week after her disappearance. See Pamela J.
Johnson, Manley Case Prompts Bill Proposal, L.A. TIMES (Ventura County), Mar. 9,
1999, at Bl. A suspect led authorities to her body. It was discovered that the suspect's
lawyer had probably known that his client had information about the location of the body
even as the lawyer negotiated with prosecutors. Id. Although the victim was dead at the
time the lawyer was negotiating, one of the aims of the bill was to address situations
where a missing person might still be alive and threatened with death if not found.

367

"[a]ny time you want to touch this area-the attorney-client privilegeyou are certainly going to have to put up a fight." 235
Whether the same fate would face an attempt to amend or otherwise
modify Business and Professions Code section 6068(e) cannot be
foreseen. There are vested interests in California that would like to
preserve the current confidentiality framework. Section 6068(e) is a
venerable statutory provision that has remained unchanged for nearly
130 years. Any attempt to carve out an exception to the duty in the
legislature will have to confront this reality. 236 To gain passage of any
exception will require deft lobbying by its proponents. Nevertheless,
the recent approval of a broader exception than most states currently
have by the Ethics 2000 Commission places section 6068(e)'s absolute
prohibition on disclosure in even starker contrast than in the past.
California stands alone, and, given the strong policies underlying a
life-threatening criminal activity exception, a bill seeking to modify
section 6068(e) along the lines suggested in this Article might gamer
sufficient support to be passed. 237 There may, however, be other means
to accomplish the same thing. These are discussed in the following
sections.
B. Providing an Exception by a Rule of Professional Conduct: The
History and Significance of Proposed California Rule 3-100,
the Lessons It Has Taught, and a Possible
Rule-Making Strategy

Another possibility for implementing a life-threatening criminal
activity exception to the duty of confidentiality would be for the
California Supreme Court to adopt a rule of professional conduct.
Carving out an exception by rule, however, is not a novel concept.
Indeed, that approach has a storied history in California. Since 1987, the
California State Bar has attempted on several occasions to create
exceptions to the duty by proposing that the supreme court adopt a rule
of professional conduct, Rule 3-100. In the dozen or so years that Rule

235. Id. Assembly Member Strickland did not misuse the term "attorney-client
privilege." When the bill was introduced, it proposed to make an exception to the
attorney-client privilege. As to the "fight" Assembly Bill 1286 encountered, the
only listed opposition to the bill was California Attorneys for Criminal Justice.
Hearing Before the Assembly Committee on Public Safety, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess.
(Cal. Jan. l l, 2000), at 7, at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/99-00/bill/asm/ab_1251I300/ab 1286 cfa 200001 l I 075754 asm comm.html. That does not mean, however,
that there were notother opponents ofthe bill who may have been working behind the
scenes to defeat the bill.
236. So too would an attempt to create an exception by rule of professional conduct.
237. See supra Part IV (discussing the character and scope an exception should take).
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3-100 has been on the table, at least five different versions of it have
been released for public comment.238 The California State Bar withdrew
two of these before submitting them to the supreme court for approval.
The supreme court rejected the other three, the two most recent
rejections being made without comment.
A consideration of Rule 3-lO0's history is instructive. What becomes
apparent is that California's unique regulatory framework, 239 regulation
of lawyers by both legislatively enacted statutes and court-adopted rules,
has presented obstacles to rule adoption that are not present in other
jurisdictions.
1. The History of Rule 3-100: A Doomed Rule?

The initial incarnation of Rule 3-100, submitted to the court in 1987,
included five sep·arate express exceptions to the duty, including an
exception for life-threatening criminal activity. 240 The court rejected
238. For a comprehensive summary of the history of proposed Rule 3-100, see
STATE BAR OF CAL. OFFICEOFPROF'LCOMPETENCE, PLANNING & DEV., supra note 83.
239. See supra Part ID.A.
240. The rule proposed in 1987 provided in its entirety:
Rule 3-100. Duty to Maintain Client Confidence and Secrets Inviolate.
(A) It is the duty of a member to maintain inviolate the confidence, and, at
every peril to himself or herself, to preserve the secrets of a client or
former client.
(B) Definitions.
(1) As used in this rule, "confidence" means information as defined in
Evidence Code section 952.
(2) As used in this rule, "secrets" means any information obtained by the
member during the professional relationship, or relating to the
representation, which the client has requested to be inviolate or the
disclosure of which might be embarrassing or detrimental to the
client.
(C) A member may reveal a confidence or secret:
(1) With the consent of the client; or
(2) Upon the lawful order of a tribunal and after the member has
asserted all relevant privileges of the client or former client and has
given the earliest reasonable notice of such order to the client or
former client to permit him or her to protect such confidence or
secret; or
(3) To the extent the member reasonably believes necessary:
(a) to prevent the commission of a criminal act that the member
believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm; or
(b) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of a member in a
controversy between the member and the client, to establish a
defense to a disciplinary or criminal charge or civil claim
against the member based upon conduct in which the client was
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that proposal, apparently taking the position that it did not have
authority to adopt the rule. 241
Subsequent proposals for exceptions to the duty of confidentiality
were narrower in breadth, but they had in common an exception to allow
lawyers to disclose confidential information if their clients intended to
engage in life-threatening criminal activity. However, those proposals
fared no better than the 1987 proposal.
The proposed Rule 3-100 submitted to the supreme court in 1992
was limited to exceptions applicable when the client consents and
when life-threatening criminal activity by the client is present. 242 The
involved, or to respond in any proceeding to allegations by a
client of incompetent representation in a criminal matter.
(D) Except where disclosure is otherwise permitted by this rule, a
member shall not:
(1) Use a confidence or secret of a client or former client to the
disadvantage of the client; or
(2) Use a confidence or secret of a client for the advantage of the
member or of a third person, provided that member may make
use of work product, if that is done without disclosing the
client's identity or the nature of the professional engagement for
the client.
When a member comes to know beyond a reasonable doubt
that material evidence offered to a tribunal by the member on
behalf of a client is false, the member shall confidentially
exhort the client to permit the correction of the false evidence.
If the client refuses to permit such correction, the member shall
withdraw from further representation of the client before the
tribunal if permissible under rule 3-700. If such withdrawal is
not possible, the member shall not further the deception, subject
to the duty in this rule to protect the client's confidence and
secrets.
See STATE BAR OF CAL. OFACE OF PROF'L COMPETENCE, PLANNING & DEV., supra note
83, at enclosure 4.
241. The court, in a letter to then State Bar President Terry Anderlini, suggested
that if the rule was intended to permit disclosure in a proceeding where the attorneyclient evidentiary privilege attached, the supreme court might not have the authority to
approve such a rule. See supra note 104 and accompanying text; infra notes 251-67 and
accompanying text (discussing the import of this letter).
242. The 1992 proposal provided:
Rule 3-100. Duty to Maintain Client Confidence and Secrets Inviolate.
(A) It is the duty of a member to maintain inviolate the confidence, and,
at every peril to himself or herself, to preserve the secrets of a client.
(B) Definitions.
(1) As used in this rule, "confidence" means information as
defined in Evidence Code section 952.
(2) As used in this rule, "secrets" means any information obtained
by the member during the professional relationship, or relating
to the representation, which the client has requested to be
inviolate or the disclosure of which might be embarrassing or
detrimental to the client.
(C) A member is not subject to discipline who reveals a confidence or
secret:
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drafters of the 1992 proposal took a different approach to providing an
exception to the duty of confidentiality. In 1987, the proposed rule
was written as an express exception to the duty of confidentiality, that
is, it stated that a lawyer "may reveal a confidence or secret."243 In
essence, the 1987 version stated that, notwithstanding section
6068(e)'s prohibitions on disclosure of confidential information, a
lawyer "may" disclose under the stated circumstances. 244 Such an
approach runs directly counter to the express language of the
legislatively enacted section 6068(e) and could have been viewed as a
frontal attack on a legislative prerogative.
The 1992 proposed rule, on the other hand, was drafted to provide a
safe harbor for the disclosing lawyer. It stated that a lawyer "is not
subject to discipline who reveals a confidence or secret."245 A rule
phrased in that way would not have directly contravened the language
of section 6068(e). Instead, it would have been an unambiguous
statement by the State Bar of California that, under the narrow
circumstances identified in the rule (disclosures with client consent or
where life-threatening criminal activity is present), it would not subject
a lawyer to discipline. That this approach might be a distinction
without a difference is suggested not only by the supreme court's
rejection of the 1992 proposal, but also by the California State Bar in
1998 abandoning the safe harbor strategy in favor of a rule taking the
1987 approach-expressly permitting disclosures. 246 The latter
(1) With the consent of the client; or
(2) To the extent the member reasonably believes necessary to
prevent the commission of a criminal act that the member
believes is imminently likely to result in death or substantial
bodily harm.
See STA1E BAR OF CAL. OFFICE OF PROF'L COMPE1ENCE, PLANNING & DEV., supra note
83, at enclosure 9.
243. Id. at enclosure 4.
244. Id.
245. Id. at enclosure 9.
246. The 1998 proposal provided:
Rule 3-100: Confidential Information Relating to Certain Criminal Acts.
(A) A member may, but is not required to, reveal confidential information
relating to the representation of a client to the extent that the member
reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary to prevent the client from
committing a criminal act that the member believes is likely to result in
death or substantial bodily harm.
(B) For purposes of this rule, "confidential information" means information
related to the representation of a client that:
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approach fared no better than it had in 1987; the supreme court again
rejected the proposed rule.
2. The California Supreme Court's Concern: A Statutory Framework

Impervious to Rulemaking

Although we cannot know precisely why the California Supreme
Court has rejected the Rule 3-100 proposals, its letter to then State Bar
President Terry Anderlini in 1987 provides strong clues. 247 In that letter,
the court stated: "To the extent it [proposed Rule 3-100] permits
disclosure in a judicial proceeding where no statutory exception to the
privilege exists, it may be inconsistent with, or contravene the
Legislature's intent underlying Evidence Code section 950 et seq."248
This observation appears to show a court concerned that its adoption of a
life-threatening crime exception to the duty of confidentiality would
undermine the legislative framework created for the attorney-client
privilege. That the court was unsure of its authority under these
circumstances is reflected in the question it asked in closing: "Where the
Legislature has codified, and revised, or supplanted privileges previously
available at common law, does the court have inherent authority to
modify this statutory privilege?"249
To understand the court's concern, it is helpful to review the
framework of the attorney-client privilege within the California
Evidence Code. Evidence Code section 954 contains the basic statement
of the attorney-client privilege. 250 It provides, in pertinent part, that
"except as otherwise provided in this Article, the client, whether or not a
party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from
disclosing, a confidential communication between client and lawyer if
the privilege is claimed by" the privilege holder, 251 the privilege holder's
(1) is subject to the lawyer-client privilege, or
(2) has been acquired from any source, and
(a) which the client has requested be held inviolate, or
(b) the disclosure of which is likely to be embarrassing or
detrimental to the client.
Id., at enclosure 1.
247. See id. at 10-11 (quoting Letter from the California Supreme Court, to Terri
Anderlini, President, State Bar of California (June 9, 1998)).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. California Evidence Code section 954 remains largely unchanged since the
supreme court wrote that letter. The only change since then was in 1994, when the section
was amended to clarify that the word "person" as used in the section also includes "limited
liability companies." S.B. 2053, 1993-1994 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 1994), available at
http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/93-94/bill/sen/sb_2051-21 OO/sb_2053_bill_9406 l 3_amended_asm.
251. CAL. Evrn. CODE§ 954(a) (West 1995). California Evidence Code section 953
defines the "holder of the privilege" to mean:
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authorized representative,252 or "the person who was the lawyer at the
time of the confidential communication."253 Thus, section 954 identifies
who may claim the privilege and under what circumstances it may be
claimed.254
Moreover, section 955 of the Evidence Code provides that any lawyer
who has "received or made a communication subject to the privilege"
must claim the privilege "whenever he is present when the
communication is sought to be disclosed" and the lawyer "is authorized
to claim the privilege."255 Put another way, section 955 sets forth when a
lawyer must claim the privilege.256 Together with section 954, which
(a) The client when he has no guardian or conservator.
(b) A guardian or conservator of the client when the client has a guardian
or conservator.
(c)The personal representative of the client if the client is dead.
(d) A successor, assign, trustee in dissolution, or any similar representative
of a finn, association, organization, partnership, business trust, corporation, or
public entity that is no longer in existence.
Id.§ 953 (emphasis added).
252. Id. § 954(b ).
253. Id.§ 954(c).
254. Other sections of the Evidence Code offer "lawyer" definitions. "Lawyer" is
defined as: "a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to be authorized, to
practice law in any state or nation." Id. § 950. "Client" is defined as:
a person who, directly or through an authorized representative, consults a
lawyer for the purpose of retaining the lawyer or securing legal service or
advice from him in his professional capacity, and includes an incompetent (a)
who himself so consults the lawyer or (b) whose guardian or conservator so
consults the lawyer in behalf of the incompetent.
Id. § 951. "A confidential communication between client and lawyer'' means:
[l]nfonnation transmitted between a client and his or her lawyer in the course
of that relationship and in confidence by a means which, so far as the client is
aware, discloses the infonnation to no third persons other than those who are
present to further the interest of the client in the consultation or those to whom
disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the infonnation or
the accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer is consulted, and
includes a legal opinion fanned and the advice given by the lawyer in the
course of that relationship.
Id.§ 952.
255. In its entirety, section 955 provides: "The lawyer who received or made a
communication subject to the privilege under this article shall claim the privilege
whenever he is present when the communication is sought to be disclosed and is
authorized to claim the privilege under subdivision (c) of Section 954." Id. § 955
(emphasis added).
256. Section 955 creates for California lawyers a duty to claim the privilege
whenever a person seeks to compel disclosure. Compare section 954, which sets out the
circumstances under which the privilege may be claimed-when disclosure is sought to
be compelled. Id. § 954. Because section 954 is "[s]ubject to Section 912," the provision
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sets out the circumstances under which the privilege may be claimed and
by whom, section 955 requires a lawyer to assert the privilege whenever
some person seeks to compel disclosure of a communication subject to
the privilege.
The privilege, however, is not absolute. Sections 956 through 962 of
the Evidence Code remove the evidentiary protection of the privilege
under certain circumstances. 257 Thus, the attorney-client privilege set
out in section 954, and the corresponding lawyer's duty to assert it under
section 955, are not triggered if one of the exceptions contained in
sections 956 through 962 is applicable. If an exception to the privilege
exists, a lawyer can be compelled to disclose the client's "confidential
communication."258 Conversely, if there is no exception, then the lawyer
has a duty to assert the privilege pursuant to Evidence Code section 955.
Keeping in mind the foregoing framework that requires a lawyer to
assert the privilege unless there is an exception, the court's
preoccupation with the privilege in the context of the California State
Bar's proposal to revise the lawyer's duty of confidentiality is evident.
In 1988 when the court wrote President Anderlini, there was no
exception to the attorney-client privilege allowing a lawyer to disclose a
client's life-threatening criminal activity. The legislature did not enact
section 956.5 of the Evidence Code until September 17, 1993.259
Without that exception, a lawyer could not, consistent with her duty
under Evidence Code section 955 that mandates assertion of the
privilege, disclose information otherwise protected by the privilege,
including a client's life-threatening criminal activity. Thus, the supreme
court in 1988 was faced with the following dilemma: if it were to carve
out a life-threatening criminal activity exception to the duty of
confidentiality (which includes within its scope attorney-client
that addresses waiver of the privilege, it also recognizes that a client may waive the
privilege. Id. Section 912 provides that the privilege is waived "if any holder of the
privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has
consented to such disclosure made by anyone." Id. § 912.
257. Sections 956 through 962 all begin by stating, "There is no privilege" and then
proceed to describe the conditions under which the privilege is deemed not to apply.
See id. §§ 956-962. For example, section 956 provides that "There is no privilege under
this article if the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone
to commit or plan to commit a crime or a fraud." Id. § 956.
258. See section 952 for the definition of "confidential communication." See id.
§ 952; supra note 254 and accompanying text.
259. Section 956.5 was enrolled on September 17, 1993, signed by the Governor on
October 9, 1993, and chaptered by the Secretary of State on October 11, 1993. It became
effective on January 1, 1994. See Complete Bill History: Bill Number: S.B. No. 645,
available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/93-94/bill/sen/sb_060 l-0650/sb_645_bil I_
history (last visited May 18, 2002). Links to other related documents are available at
http://info.sen.ca.gov/c't!).-bin/postquery?bill_number=sb_645&sess=9394&house=B&site=sen
(last visited May 18, 2002).
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privileged matter)260 and the statutory attorney-client privilege did not
contain a corresponding exception, the court would have interfered with
the framework reflecting the legislature's intent in codifying the
attorney-client privilege.
That is why the court suggested that "[t]o the extent [an exception to
the duty of confidentiality] permits disclosure in a judicial proceeding
where no statutory exception to the privilege exists, it may be
inconsistent with, or contravene the Legislature's intent underlying
Evidence Code section 950 et seq."261 The effect of a rule allowing
disclosure would effectively run at counter-purposes to the then absolute
duty to assert the privilege under section 955. Given that a privilege can
be created, and presumably modified, only by statute,262 the court
understandably questioned whether it had the authority to modify the
duty of confidentiality.263
If the foregoing interpretation of the 1988 version of Rule 3-100 and
the supreme court's rejection is accurate, then the California Supreme
Court should not be averse to modifying the duty of confidentiality to
include an express exception so long as there is a corresponding
exception to the attorney-client privilege. As section 956.5 now
provides a life-threatening criminal activity exception to the attorney
client privilege, one would think the court should welcome the
opportunity to adopt a rule that provides such an exception.
There are problems with this analysis, however, not the least of which
are the court's rejections of a proposed Rule 3-100 in 1993 and 1998.264
Although the 1993 rejection possibly can be explained by the legislature
not yet having enacted section 956.5, it is more difficult to square the
foregoing analysis with the 1998 rejection.
First, in June 1993, when the supreme court rejected without comment
the proposed rule, the legislature was considering an amendment to the
Evidence Code to create an exception for life-threatening criminal
activity. The bill containing language that is now codified at section
956.5 was not passed until September 17, 1993, so it is possible that the
260. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
261. STAIB BAR OF CAL. OFFICE OF PROF'L COMPETENCE, PLANNING & DEV., supra
note 83, at 10-11.
262. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 911 (West 1995) (''Except as otherwise provided by
statute ...."); see also supra note 107.
263. See discussion supra note 104; sources cited supra note 104; supra note 107.
264. See id. at 12-14; see also Nancy McCarthy, Court Rejects Rule to Bare
Secrets, CAL. BARJ., Oct. 1998, at 4.
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court's rejection of Rule 3-100 in 1993 was for the same reasons posited
above for its 1988 rejection. However, is it really conceivable that the
court was unaware that section 956.5 was under consideration?265
Assuming the court was aware of the pending bill containing new
section 956.5, and further, assuming that the reason the court rejected the
1987 proposal was the absence of a bodily harm exception to the lawyerclient privilege, why would it not have awaited final legislative
resolution of the bill? With a privilege exception in place, the objections
it stated in 1988 should have been assuaged.
Second, and even more telling, is the supreme court's rejection in
1998 of yet another version of proposed Rule 3-100.266 There would
have been no question then whether the court was aware of the
disconnect between Business and Professions Code section 6068(e) and
Evidence Code section 956.5. Indeed, it was that very inconsistency that
motivated the California State Bar to again submit a proposed Rule 3100. The California State Bar announced that its express purpose in
submitting another Rule 3-100 was to harmonize Business and
Professions Code section 6068(e) with Evidence Code section 956.5. 267
Therefore, the court was abundantly aware not only of the existence of
Evidence Code section 956.5, but also of the inconsistency between it
and Business and Professions Code section 6068(e). Nevertheless, the
court rejected the proposed rule. 268
The mostly likely explanations for what we see in the court's rejection
of Rule 3-100 is either antipathy on the part of the court to
265. As already discussed, the bill that contained then-proposed section 956.5 was
introduced on March 2, 1993, so it would have been pending as the court considered the
1993 proposal. See discussion supra note 91.
266. See McCarthy, supra note 264, at 4.
267. In its May 1998 submission to the supreme court, the state bar stated:
The intent of proposed new rule 3-100 is to accomplish the limited goal of
harmonizing the ethical duty of confidentiality stated in Business and
Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e), with the statutory exception to
the lawyer-client privilege stated in Evidence Code section 956.5. Evidence
Code section 956.5, which became operative on January 1, 1994, creates an
exception to the lawyer-client privilege....
The enactment of section 956.5 has caused concern among members of
the bar because it creates uncertainty regarding the relationship between it and
the ethical duty to maintain a client's confidence and secrets under Business
and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e), which states that it is a
duty of an attorney to "maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to
himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client." While there are
numerous statutory exceptions to the lawyer-client privilege found in Evidence
Code section 950 et seq., there are no statutory exceptions to the ethical duty
found in Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e).
STATE BAR OF CAL. OFFICE OF PROF'L COMPETENCE, PLANNING & DEV., supra note 83, at 2.
268. But see infra notes 277-85 and accompanying text.
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confidentiality exceptions, or simply its reluctance to invade a statutory
framework. Of course, it is always possible that the court believed it had
already addressed the issue in General Dynamics by reference to
Evidence Code section 956.5 in the context of a retaliatory discharge
suit,269 and was sending a signal that the members of the bar should
recognize that.270 There is yet another possible explanation to be drawn
from Rule 3-lO0's notorious history, discussed below, but before
addressing that, it is worth considering a recent California Supreme
Court opinion that demonstrates the court's reluctance to invade a
legislatively enacted statutory scheme.
3. Further Evidence of the Court's Reluctance to Invade a Statutory
Framework: Foxgate Homeowners Ass'n v. Bramalea California, Inc.

A further hint that the supreme court may not welcome any further
proposals to modify the duty of confidentiality by rule can be found in
one of its recent opinions, Foxgate Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Bramalea
California, Inc., 271 where the court invalidated a judicially created
exception to a statutory scheme that the legislature had enacted to
encourage mediation. Foxgate involved a mediation held pursuant to
statutes designed to ensure the confidentiality of mediations. 272 The
269. See supra notes 115-51 and accompanying text
270. It is always possible, however, that this Article's surmises about section 956.5,
General Dynamics, and the duty of confidentiality are simply misguided and that the
court believes it has plainly addressed the issues raised in this Article already. This is
reminiscent of the scene from Woody Allen's film, "Annie Hall," where Mr. Allen's
character, Alvy Singer, is waiting in line to see a film, listening with increasing irritation
to the person in front of him who is pontificating to his date about Marshal McLuhan.
Finally, Alvy can take no more and tells the man (who has informed Allen that he
teaches a course on McLuhan at Columbia University) that he does not know anything
about McLuhan. Alvy then brings McLuhan out from behind a standing movie poster.
McLuhan, in bowler hat, tells the man: "I heard what you were saying. You know
nothing of my work. You mean my whole fallacy is wrong. How you ever got to teach a
course in anything is totally amazing." ANNIE HALL (MGM Home Entm't 1977). The
Author, like all law professors who attempt to parse what they believe is an ambiguous
opinion, fears such a "McLuhan moment."
271. 25 P.3d 1117 (Cal. 2001).
272. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 703.5, 1121, 1119 (West 1995 & Supp. 2002). For
example, section 703.5 provides in pertinent part:
No person presiding at any judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, and no
arbitrator or mediator, shall be competent to testify, in any subsequent civil
proceeding, as to any statement, conduct, decision, or ruling, occurring at or in
conjunction with the prior proceeding, except as to a statement or conduct that
could (a) give rise to civil or criminal contempt, (b) constitute a crime, (c) be
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mediator submitted a report to the superior court that included
statements made during the mediation. The statements in turn became
the basis for the superior court's imposition of sanctions against the
appellants. In affirming, the court of appeal created a narrow,
nonstatutory exception to the statutes' confidentiality requirements that
would permit "a mediator to report to a court only information that is
reasonably necessary to describe sanctionable conduct and place that
conduct in context."273
The supreme court granted review and reversed. It first noted that
"[t]o carry out the purpose of encouraging mediation by ensuring
confidentiality, the statutory scheme, which includes sections 703.5,
1119, and 1121, unqualifiedly bars disclosure of communications made
during mediation absent an express statutory exception."274 The court
then stated:
[W]e do not agree with the Court of Appeal that the court may fashion an
exception for bad faith in mediation because failure to authorize reporting of
such conduct during mediation may lead to "an absurd result" or fail to carry
out the legislative policy of encouraging mediation. The Legislature has
decided that the policy of encouraging mediation by ensuring confidentiality is
promoted by avoiding the threat that frank expression of viewpoints by the
parties during mediation may subject a participant to a motion for imposition of
sanctions by another party or the mediator who might assert that those views
constitute a bad faith failure to participate in mediation. Therefore, even were
the court free to ignore the plain language of the confidentiality statutes, there is
no justification for doing so here.275

The court's language in Foxgate demonstrates a decided reluctance on
its part to interpose itself into a statutory scheme, at least through the
device of a judicially created exception. The same view has probably
informed its repeated rejections of Rule 3-100. Those rejections
the subject of investigation by the State Bar or Commission on Judicial
Performance, or (d) give rise to disqualification proceedings ....
Id.§ 703.5.
Section 1121 provides:
Neither a mediator nor anyone else may submit to a court or other adjudicative
body, and a court or other adjudicative body may not consider, any report,
assessment, evaluation, recommendation, or finding of any kind by the
mediator concerning a mediation conducted by the mediator, other than a
report that is mandated by court rule or other law and that states only whether
an agreement was reached, unless all parties to the mediation expressly agree
otherwise in writing, or orally in accordance with Section 1118.
Id. § 1121.
Finally, section I 119(c) provides: "All communications, negotiations, or settlement
discussions by and between participants in the course of a mediation or a mediation
consultation shall remain confidential." Id.§ I I 19(c) (emphasis added).
273. Foxgate Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 25 P.3d at 1123.
274. Id. at 1126.
275. Id. at 1128.
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probably do not reflect a deep-seated antipathy, alluded to earlier, on the
court's part to exceptions to the duty of confidentiality. Rather, they
more likely evince the court's belief that it does not have the authority to
upend the absolute language of Business and Professions Code section
6068(e), notwithstanding the existence of 956.5.276 In short, California's
unique regulatory framework comprised of both statutes and
professional conduct rules has probably done more than anything else to
forestall the adoption in California of a life-threatening criminal activity
exception.

276. In 1998, the California Supreme Court decided a case that has surface appeal
for supporting the proposition that under its inherent authority to regulate the legal
profession, the court can adopt a rule that runs counter to section 6068(e). In that case,
In re Attorney Discipline Sys., 967 P.2d 49, 54 (Cal. 1998), the court held that it had
inherent authority over the discipline of lawyers, and that it could impose fees on
lawyers without invading either the legislature's taxation power or its appropriation
power, or violating the separation or powers clause of the California Constitution. That
case, however, was decided under extenuating circumstances-a bar disciplinary system
choked with a backlog of client complaints against lawyers due to then Governor Wilson's
refusal to approve the bill the legislature had passed authorizing the state bar to collect dues
from its members during 1998 and 1999. Nancy McCarthy, Supreme Court Orders $173
Fee: Unprecedented, Unanimous Ruling Enables Bar to Begin Rebuilding Discipline
System, CAL B.J., Jan. 1999, at 1, http://www.ca1bar.cagov/calbar/2cbj/99jan/index.htm.
The court resolved that impasse, but in doing so it stressed the pressing public need to take
the action that it did. In re Attorney Discipline Sys., 967 P.2d at 68-70. It also cannot be
stressed enough that the court was operating in a vacuum. There was no statute enabling
the bar to collect dues; the court acted to fill a void created by the governor's refusal to sign
the fees bill. Indeed, in rejecting the governor's argument that the court could use the
"resources" of the bar but not its "structure" in implementing a disciplinary system under
the court's direct control, the court stated:
In our view, it would be far more intrusive for the court to exert authority over
resources that the bar has available to it under previous legislative
authorization that dedicates these resources to purposes other than discipline,
than to impose additional fees to support the existing disciplinary system ....
Tampering with the existing resources collected and allocated to the bar
pursuant to valid existing legislation, particularly funds designated for uses
other than discipline, would not be deferential to the Legislature's traditional
and continuing role in this area.
Id. at 71. Notwithstanding its continued acknowledgement that it has inherent authority
to regulate the legal profession, the court's recognition that it was acting to fill a void
created by the inaction of the legislative and executive branches suggests that the court
would not reverse its previously stated concerns about its authority to change a
legislative enactment. Id. at 54. Thus, In re Attorney Discipline System probably does
not support the proposition that the court may now act to approve a rule of professional
conduct creating an exception to the statutory duty of confidentiality. But see infra notes
277-85 and accompanying text (suggesting that the court's inherent authority to
discipline lawyers may allow it to provide lawyers a safe harbor from discipline).
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4. A Safe Harbor Rule: A Small Window of Opportunity or a
Stubborn Refusal to Give Up?

Nevertheless, there may yet be a small window of opportunity for the
court, without trespassing on the legislature's domain, to promulgate a
rule that would signal to lawyers that they may disclose confidential
information where life-threatening criminal conduct by their clients
exists. As discussed previously, in 1993, the bar submitted a "safe
harbor" approach for the court's approval. 277 Under that strategy, it
could be argued that the court would not invade the legislature's power;
rather, the rule would simply be a statement that under the narrow
circumstances identified in the rule (disclosure where life-threatening
criminal activity is present), the bar would not prosecute the lawyer.
As already noted, the history of Rule 3-100 suggests this might be a
distinction without a difference, as the 1993 proposal was rejected. 278
When the supreme court rejected the 1993 proposal, however, section
956.5, which would have assuaged the concerns the court expressed in
1987, had not yet been enacted. Further, recall that in 1998, with section
956.5 then in effect, the bar abandoned its safe harbor strategy and
returned to a rule that provided an express exception to section 6068(e).
It is possible, then, that the 1998 proposal owes its rebuff to the bar's
decision to make a "frontal assault" on section 6068(e). Had the bar
pursued a strategy proposing the safe harbor rule in concert with section
956.5, the court may well have adopted the rule. 279
But why would a safe harbor rule stating that the disclosing lawyer
will not be subject to discipline be different from a rule expressly stating
that the lawyer could disclose in contravention of section 6068(e)? Are
the two approaches not in effect the same: both result in the disclosing
lawyer not being disciplined? Perhaps the answer to this question lies in
the court's acknowledgement in In re Attorney Discipline System of its
well-established, inherent authority over the discipline of California
lawyers. 280 While the two approaches may have the same effect, the
277. See supra notes 242-50 and accompanying text. The rule would state: "A
lawyer is not subject to discipline who reveals a confidence or secret to the extent the
member reasonably believes necessary to prevent the commission of a criminal act that
the member believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm," or something
to that effect.
278. See supra notes 242-50 and accompanying text.
279. There is, of course, the possibility that when the court rejected the 1993 safe
harbor proposal, it was because it expected Evidence Code section 956.5 to be enacted.
The court could have believed that section 956.5 would apply with equal force to both
the attorney-client privilege and Business and Professions Code section 6068(e). If that
were the case, it would have seen no purpose at all in a Rule 3-100. See discussion supra
note 270.
280. In re Attorney Discipline System, 967 P.2d at 54.
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direct approach invades the legislature's authority to amend section
6068(e). The safe harbor approach, on the other hand, preserves the
integrity of section 6068(e)'s language, but gives notice to lawyers that,
notwithstanding section 6068(e)' s absolute prohibition on disclosures,
under certain circumstances public policy considerations militate against
the imposition of discipline. Under this approach, the language of
section 6068(e) would continue to put lawyers on notice of their critical
duty to preserve their client's confidential information. Moreover,
lawyers who disclose still would have to satisfy stiff requirements-their
reasonable belief that disclosure is necessary to prevent a criminal act
that will result in death or serious bodily harm-to escape discipline.
However, lawyers would no longer be subject to the uncertainty
generated by the "logical disconnect" between Evidence Code section
956.6 and Business and Professions Code section 6068(e) when
confronted with life-threatening criminal activity. They would be able
to make the difficult decision about whether to disclose without having
bar discipline hanging over their heads. 281
281. The approach espoused in this Section should be reminiscent of the position
the Los Angeles County Bar took in its Formal Opinion 436, that is, that policy
considerations underlying the bodily harm exception should permit an implied exception
to section 6068(e). The difference here is that protection from discipline for the
disclosing lawyer need no longer be implied and consequently, need no longer be
uncertain. Moreover, a rule of professional conduct carries with it the authority lacking
in a local bar opinion. See CAL. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 1-100 (2000).
The advantages of a rule that provides unambiguous guidance to lawyers can be seen
in the Ossias-Quackenbush Insurance Department matter that played out in California in
late spring and summer of 2000.
Chuck Quackenbush, California's Insurance
Commissioner, improperly settled cases against insurance companies and used the
proceeds of the settlement to fund television commercials in which he starred. A lawyer
in the department, Cindy Ossias, frustrated by Mr. Quackenbush's conduct, eventually
provided the Assembly's Insurance Committee with documentation of the
Commissioner's misconduct. She was put on immediate administrative leave by the
department, but after Mr. Quackenbush resigned, she was reinstated. Her troubles did
not end there. She became the subject of a state bar investigation. Virginia Ellis & Carl
Ingram, Whistle-Blower Emerges in Quackenbush Probe, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 2000, at
Al; Virginia Ellis & Miguel Bustillo, Quackenbush Hearings Take Dramatic Turn, L.A.
TIMES, June 27, 2000, at Al; Virginia Ellis & Carl Ingram, Quackenbush Resigns; Probe
Will Continue, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 2000, at Al; Virginia Ellis, State Insurance Dept.
Reinstates Whistle-Blower, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2000, at A33. Eventually, the state bar
closed its investigation. Letter from Donald R. Steedman, Deputy Trial Counsel, State
Bar of California, to Richard A. Zitrin, Counsel for Cindy Ossias (Oct. 11, 2000), in
DAILY RECORDER, Dec. 13, 2000, at 7. However, Ossias had no guidance on how to
proceed. Had she had proper guidance, perhaps in the form of a rule that spelled out for
her what her options were when confronted by a situation where it is the head of the
governmental agency who is acting improperly, she and the state bar may have avoided
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C. Strategies Involving Coordination Between the Supreme Court, the
State Bar, and the Legislature

There are two other strategies for implementing a bodily harm
exception. They both would involve coordination between the bar, the
supreme court, and the legislature.
I. Parallel Regulation by Statute and Rule

First, the legislature and the court could coordinate the amendment
of Business and Professions Code section 6068(e) to include the bodily
harm exception with the promulgation of a rule of professional conduct
that mirrors the amended statute. There is precedent for such parallel
regulation. For example, both Business and Professions Code section
6068(m) and Rule 3-500 require that a lawyer notify his or her client of
significant developments that arise during the representation. 282 Requiring
a lawyer to notify the client of significant developments and promptly
complying with reasonable requests for information and significant
documents is not, however, either a very controversial issue or one that
involves the balancing of competing public policies that underlie
exceptions to the core duty of confidentiality.
Any rule involving the duty of confidentiality is much more
the time, expense, and emotional drain of a formal investigation.
Eventually, her experience led to the introduction of Assembly Bill 363. See Assemb. B.
363, 2001 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/asm/ab_035l0400/ab_363_bill_ 20010220_introduced.html. Consideration of Assembly Bill 363 was
suspended while the State Bar of California reviewed and addressed the issue. For a
history of Assembly Bill 363, see Complete Bill History, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/
bill/asm/ab_0351-0400/ab_363_bi11_200l0822_history.html (last visited May 21, 2002). The
state bar's review, in cooperation with parties interested in the issue, resulted in
proposed revisions to Rule 3-600. STATE BAR OF CAL., REQUEST THAT THE SUPREME
COURT OF CALIFORNIA APPROVE AMENDMENTS TO RULE 3-600 OF THE RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, AND MEMORANDUM
AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS IN EXPLANATION (2002), available at http://www.calbar.
ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/rule3-600request.pdf. See also infra note 291.
282. California Business and Professions Code section 6068(m) provides that the
attorney's duty is: "To respond promptly to reasonable status inquiries of clients and to
keep clients reasonably informed of significant developments in matters with regard to
which the attorney has agreed to provide legal services." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
6068(m) (West 1990 & Supp. 2002).
Cal. Rule 3-500, provides: "A member shall keep a client reasonably informed about
significant developments relating to the employment or representation, including
promptly complying with reasonable requests for information and copies of significant
documents when necessary to keep the client so informed." CAL. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3-500.
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controversial, and the likelihood of reaching a consensus among the bar,
the court, and the legislature on the scope, or even the efficacy, of the
rule would not be great. 283 Moreover, even if the rule proved amenable
to consensus on the issue of life-threatening criminal activity, there may
be other exceptions to the duty that are warranted that may not be as
susceptible to achieving consensus. This consideration leads to a
proposal that will no doubt be viewed as controversial in itself: transfer
the duty of confidentiality from Business and Professions Code section
6068(e) to a rule of professional conduct.

2. Transferring the Duty of Confidentiality to a Rule of
Professional Conduct
A second proposal that would involve coordination among the court,
the legislature, and the bar is for the legislature to repeal Business and
Professions Code section 6068(e), effective upon the supreme court
adopting a rule of professional conduct that parallels section 6068(e).
This is a controversial proposal if for no other reason than it would put
the duty of confidentiality out of the house, where it has resided (both
literally and figuratively) for nearly 130 years.
As can be seen from the previous discussion regarding the
introduction and expiration of AB 1286,284 the legislature may be more
susceptible than the court to political pressures brought on by sensational
events. Indeed, even where proposed amendments to the duty are
compelling, the legislature is probably more susceptible than the court to
the pressures of various interested parties, and the compromises that
likely would ensue might weaken the proposed legislation. Given the
centrality of the duty of confidentiality to the attorney-client relationship
and by extension, our legal system, the compromises that are the lifeblood of legislation might ultimately prove fatal.
This is not to say that the court is immune to political pressures.
However, free from term limits and being subject to elections only once
every twelve years, the court is probably less susceptible to such
pressures than the legislature. In addition, the public comment review
period for proposed rules is well-designed to garner opinion from the
public and the various sectors within the bar. Both the California State
Bar and the court are sensitive to the concerns of their constituents, and
283.
284.

See supra notes 228-39 and accompanying text
See supra notes 228-39 and accompanying text.
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there are numerous instances where public comment has resulted in
substantial revisions of, or even withdrawal of the proposed rule. 285
Moreover, the court has demonstrated a marked inclination to protect the
interests of the client and preserve the attorney-client relationship, two
of the policy objectives of the duty of confidentiality. 286 It would not be
quick to engage in wholesale modifications to this most central of a
lawyer's duties.
A further consideration favoring the transfer of the duty to a rule of
professional conduct is the California State Bar's Commission for the
Revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Commission). The
Commission has been charged by the state bar with reviewing the
current California Rules in light of the revisions to the Model Rules
proposed by the Ethics 2000 Commission. 287 The Commission will thus
285. Consider, for example, the history of Rule 3-100. In addition, recent rule
proposals have been withdrawn after being sent out for public comments. See, e.g., State
Bar of Cal., Member/Public Comment: Proposed Amendment to Rule 3-310, available at
http://www.calbar.org/2bar/3com/3cp9805.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2002) (addressing
conflict of interest); State Bar of Cal, Member/Public Comment: Proposed New Rule 4110, available at http://www.calbar.org/2bar/3com/3cpro22a.htm (last visited Apr. 24,
2002) (addressing issue of advanced fees).
286. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 503 (Cal.
1994) ("We emphasize the limited scope of our conclusion that in-house counsel may
state a cause of action in tort for retaliatory discharge. The lawyer's high duty of fidelity
to the interests of the client work against a tort remedy that is coextensive with that
available to the nonattorney employee."); id. at 503-04 ("In any event, where the
elements of a wrongful discharge in violation of a fundamental public policy claim
cannot, for reasons peculiar to the particular case, be fully established without breaching
the attorney-client privilege, the suit must be dismissed in the interest of preserving the
privilege."); see also Flatt v. Superior Court, 885 P.2d 950, 951 (Cal. 1994).
287. The Commission's Charter states, inter alia, that:
[T]he Commission is to consider, along with judicial and statutory
developments, the Final Report and Recommendations of the American Bar
Association's ("ABA") Ethics 2000 Commission and the American Law
Institute's Restatement of the Law Third, The Law Governing Lawyers
("Restatement"), as well as other authorities relevant to the development of
professional responsibility standards.
Commission for the Revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct, Commission
Charter, at http://www.calbar.org/2eth/3crrpc/index.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2002).
Related to the theme of this Article, it is of some interest to also note that:
The Commission is to develop proposed amendments to the California Rules
that:
1. Facilitate compliance with and enforcement of the rules by
eliminating ambiguities and uncertainties in the rules;
2. Assure adequate protection to the public in light of developments
that have occurred since the rules were last reviewed and amended in
1989 and 1992;
3. Promote confidence in the legal profession and the administration of
justice; and
4. Eliminate and avoid unnecessary differences between California and
other states, fostering the evolution of a national standard with
respect to professional responsibility issues.
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be well positioned to consider any proposed revisions to the duty of
confidentiality and their interrelationship with any other proposed
revisions that will be before it.
Finally, it is important to remember that even if the duty of
confidentiality is transferred to a rule of professional conduct, the
legislature will not be relinquishing control in the area of
confidentiality. The attorney-client privilege, which in California is a
exclusively a legislative bailiwick,288 will still be within its sole
purview. Moreover, the court's reluctance to adopt rule 3-100 absent
an exception to _the privilege that paralleled the proposed rule, 289 and its
strong statements in General Dynamics that an in-house lawyer would
be able to proceed with a retaliatory discharge claim only where there
were "well-recognized exceptions to the attorney-client privilege,"290
both demonstrate that the court will not blaze new trails in California's
law of confidentiality without legislative input.
This proposal would require cooperation among the legislature, the
court, and the bar. Such cooperation is not unusual. Within the last
year, these three entities or their representatives have worked in concert
to address pressing ethical issues.291 There is no reason why they cannot
Id.
288. See CAL. EVID. CODE§ 911 (West 1995).
289. See supra notes 241-50 and accompanying text.
290. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 504.
291. During 2000-2001, the California State Bar (authorized by a study bill,
Assemby Bill 2069) worked through its Standing Committee on Professional
Responsibility and Conduct (COPRAC) with various constituencies of the bar and
representatives from the legislature and other interested parties, including representatives
from the California Judicial Conference, to address the efficacy of California's
tripartite insurance defense system. See Assemb. B. 2069, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2000), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/99-00/bill/asm/ab_20512l00/ab_2069_bill_200009 l 8_chaptered.html. Further, during 2001, interested
parties, including various constituencies of the bar, representatives of the legislature and
Judicial Conference, and COPRAC cooperated in drafting a proposed amendment to
Rule 3-600 to address the issue of government lawyer whisteblowers raised by Assembly
Bill 363, which in tum sought to address issues raised by the Ossias-Quackenbush
insurance matter. See State Bar of Cal., Member/Public Commellt: Proposed Amended
Rule 3-600, available at http://www.calbar.org/2bar/3com/3cp0107.htm (last visited Apr.
24, 2002); See supra note 281 and accompanying text. After a public comment period,
the rule returned to COPRAC, which made further modifications. On January 26, 2002,
the State Bar of California's Board of Governors voted to transmit the proposed
amendments to Rule 3-600 to the California Supreme Court for its consideration.
The proposed rule and supporting documents were forwarded to the supreme court on
February 27, 2002. See STATE BAR OF CAL., REQUEST THAT THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA APPROVE AMENDMENTS TO RULE 3-600 OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
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again cooperate to finally bring California in line with other states in
having a life-threatening criminal activity exception to the duty of
confidentiality.
VI. CONCLUSION

California's law concerning lawyer confidentiality and the ability of
its lawyers to reveal confidential information to prevent life-threatening
criminal activity remains somewhat murky, notwithstanding several
attempts by the California State Bar to fashion a rule of professional
conduct that would unequivocally permit such disclosures. In light of
the recent publication of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers and revisions to the ABA's Model Rules, both of which make
strong statements favoring such disclosures, it is time for California to
join the rest of the states. Whether by modifying the duty of
confidentiality statute, by rule of professional conduct, or by an
unambiguous statement of the California Supreme Court, California
should state unequivocally that lawyers will not be subject to discipline
if they reveal confidential client information for the narrow purpose of
preventing criminal activity reasonably likely to cause death or serious
bodily harm.

CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, AND MEMORANDUM AND SUPPORTING
DOCUMENTS IN EXPLANATION (2002), available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar
/pdfs/rule3-600request.pdf. On May 10, 2002, however, the California Supreme
Court denied the request for a rule amendment with the following explanation: "The
State Bar Board of Governors' request to adopt amendments to the Rules of Professional
Conduct, rule 3-600, is denied because the proposed modifications conflict with B & P
Code 6068, (e)." California Appellate Courts, Docket Entries (Register of Actions),
http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/dockets.cfm?dist=0&doc_id= I 94954&case
=S 104682 (last visited May 22, 2002). Despite the participation of interested parties
from a wide spectrum working together to craft a solution to the concerns identified in
the Quackenbush-Ossias matter, the supreme court ultimately determined that an
amendment to rule 3-600 could not avoid the harsh realities of Business and Professions
Code section 6068(e). This disposition of the matter, perhaps predictable given
California's unique system of professional regulation, see supra Part III.A., does not
necessarily mean that diverse constituencies cannot cooperate to shape ethics rules. It
does suggest, however, that so long as a logical disconnect between the Business and
Professions Code section 6068(e) and Evidence Code section 956.5 exists, it will be
difficult if not impossible to amend the duty of confidentiality in California. The
supreme court's decision on the request to amend rule 3-600 instead demonstrates the
efficacy of the foregoing proposal: to transfer the duty of confidentiality to a rule of
professional conduct. The different groups have worked well together; they should be
able to cooperate again to accomplish the worthwhile goal of giving California an
unambiguous statement on a life-threatening criminal activity exception to the duty of
confidentiality.
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